2012 Conference on Disarmament Pakistan’s Approach towards FMCT

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The present debate on fissile material control and elimination is not new. Since the beginning of nuclear age, the nuclear abolitionists and nuclear non-proliferationists have been demanding cessation of further production of nuclear fissile material for weapons as well as elimination of existing weapon grade fissile material. The demand for such a treaty has been on the international non-proliferation agenda for most of the nuclear age. The calls for nuclear arms control and disarmament were partially accommodated in the constitution of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NNPR). Ironically, the execution of NNPR components effectively divided the states into two block—nuclear haves and have-nots—which thwarted denuclearization initiatives theoretically and practically.

The FMCT received substantial attention during the early 1990s. The current debate over the Treaty is in principle limited on the negotiating mandate for the CD, drawn from a 48/75L (1993) UN General Assembly resolution. It outlined that FMCT is to ban “the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices” and the treaty is to be “nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable.”  In response to the UN General Assembly Resolution, the CD tasked Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada to seek the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate such a treaty.  The Shannon Mandate—proposal for the negotiation—was tabled in the CD on March 24, 1995. It reads as follows:

1.    The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on a “Ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
2.    The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
3.    The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the CD on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session. During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile materials (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.  

The FMCT lost support at the CD after the US Senate refused to ratify CTBT in October 1999, Washington’s massive investment in the missile defense systems, and its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile in June 2002. The debate on the FMCT further derailed during the Bush Administration, which maintained different view about the verifiable characteristic of the FMCT. In July 2004, following a lengthy policy review, the Bush administration had adopted a new and counterproductive position—trust, but don’t verify. The officials in the administration concluded that effective international verification of an FMCT was not realistically achievable and, therefore, a final agreement could not be “effectively verifiable.” The non-nuclear member states demanded that the FMCT should include appropriate verification arrangements. Mohamed ElBaradei, the then director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) argued:

“To me, to verify a cutoff treaty means that we have to verify all enrichment/reprocessing facilities and look for any such undeclared activities, which we do now in other countries. Basically, we will have to do the same in all nuclear-weapon states and the countries outside the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan). So, I don’t see anything about the fissile material treaty—again, just off the cuff—that is different from what we do now in other places.”

Such divergences of opinion completely suspended negotiations on the Treaty.

President Obama’s Prague speech on April 5, 2009 has a positive impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as the Conference delegates (CD/1863) agreed on a program of work on May 29 2009, and ended 12 years of deadlock on FMCT.  The delegates at CD agreed to devise a comprehensive work plan including convening of a working group to start FMCT negotiations as well as substantive discussions on progress toward nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in space, and the provision of negative security assurances to states not possessing nuclear weapons. The CD also agreed to establish working groups to consider all four issues. Though the delegates did approve the program of work and dozens of them also hailed the agreement, yet a few of them expressed their reservations. For instance, Ambassador Zamir Akram of Pakistan pointed out that the agreement was “not perfect” but joined the consensus in order to end the years of deadlock in the conference. India’s representative, Hamid Ali Rao, argued in 2009 that the negotiation of an FMCT would be “a step forward” but faulted the conference for failing to agree to multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. New Delhi had softened its stance on the FMCT during the recent years due to Indo-US nuclear deal. It pledged to support FMCT negotiations at CD. Ambassador Rao of India warned that “[w]e will not accept obligations not in keeping with or prejudicial to our national security interests or which hinder our strategic program, our R&D as well as three-stage nuclear program.”  This indicated that India was not enthusiastic in the finalization of the FMCT.  

Importantly, the proposed FMCT in the CD would not make new demands on NPT non-nuclear states. Those states are already obliged not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear material and activities to verify this commitment (comprehensive safeguards). In the context of FMCT application, the states would be bracketed as non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); five NPT nuclear-weapon states—United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France and China; three non-NPT declared nuclear weapon states—India, North Korea and Pakistan; and one de facto non-NPT nuclear weapon state—Israel. Therefore, the principal effect of an FMCT and its verification task relate mainly to the nuclear-weapon states and the non-NPT states. In real term, the former group could not be forced to give up their weapons just as the latter could not be forced to give up the right to build their own.