Afghans in Pakistan: A Protracted Refugee Situation

Afghan refugees have been a protracted problem for Pakistan despite attempts to repatriate. It is a stark reminder that other avenues apart from repatriation should be looked into.

Policy Perspectives , Special Issue Afghanistan, 2008

Abstract

[Afghan refugees have been a protracted problem for Pakistan despite attempts to repatriate them. The presence of over 2.1 million registered Afghan refugees by the end of the year 2007, in spite of the massive repatriation program under way since 2002, is a stark reminder to all the policymakers that other avenues apart from repatriation should be looked into to achieve the goal. The problem should be addressed in the “protracted refugee situations” context to find alternative strategies to this longstanding issue. – Author]

The presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran is a protracted problem that still awaits resolution. The belief of policymakers that comprehensive and sustainable repatriation could be achieved within the time frame of three years, i.e. 2002–2005, has proved wrong. The extensions that have been made in the time period of the current repatriation program bring into question the vision of those formulating agreements for repatriation from Pakistan and Iran. New deadlines have been set: 2008 by Iran and 2009 by Pakistan. Can the two countries shed their refugee burden within these new time frames? Given the past failures, it is highly doubtful that they can.

In the post-Soviet withdrawal period, i.e. since 1989, the presence of millions of Afghan refugees has been questioned by many in Pakistan. They are considered a huge burden on the economy, environment and infrastructure of the country. This paper looks at the problem of Afghan refugees in Pakistan as a ‘protracted situation.’ Thus far, hardly any study has been conducted on Afghan refugees in this framework. However, a great deal of research needs to be conducted from this perspective, as ‘repatriation,’ the option most favored by the international community, has not relieved Pakistan of Afghan refugees.

Protracted Refugee Situations

In simpler terms, refugees in protracted situations find themselves trapped in an indeterminate state: they cannot go back to their homeland, in most cases because it is not safe for them to do so; they are unable to settle permanently in their country of first asylum, because the host state does not want them to remain indefinitely on its territory; and they do not have the option of moving on, as no third country has agreed to admit them and to provide them with permanent residence rights.

The UNHCR working definition does not, however, fully encompass the realities of such situations. A more effective definition of protracted refugee situations would include not only the humanitarian elements proposed by UNHCR, but also a wider understanding of the political and strategic aspects of long-term refugee problems. Secondly, a definition should reflect the fact that protracted refugee situations also include chronic, unresolved and recurring refugee problems. Thirdly, an effective definition must recognize that countries of origin, host countries and the international donor community are all implicated in long-term refugee situations.

While the notion of protracted refugee situations is not new, the increasing interest in the concept is a recent development. It is still evolving, and funds are being poured into various projects to better understand the dynamics and implications of contemporary long-term refugee problems. This sudden emphasis on ‘protracted refugee situations’ is, however, a pointer that the accepted durable solutions to refugee problems are not working in all the cases, and new approaches need to be developed. Repatriation, the most preferred durable solution, has not worked in many situations, leading to the continuation of refugee presence in host countries. The increase in the number of protracted refugee situations in the world represents the failures of the responses of the actors concerned, which have contributed in the prolonged exile, continued economic, social and psychological suffering, and unending frustration of refugees.

While major longstanding refugee populations existed in Southeast Asia, Central America, South Asia, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa during the 1980s, in the early 1990s, a number of these longstanding refugees who had been displaced as a result of the Cold War conflicts in the developing world went home. Throughout the 1990s, given its focus on refugee emergencies, the international community largely ignored the challenge of formulating comprehensive responses to protracted refugee situations. There was more emphasis on repatriation as the preferred durable solution, and the decade was termed as one of ‘repatriation.’ Huge numbers of refugees went back to their countries as the Cold War came to an end and conflicts around the world were resolved. However, new intra-state conflicts emerged and resulted in massive new flows during the 1990s, which led to a spiraling and mushrooming of the global refugee population.

At the end of 1993, the global refugee population was over 16.3 million, with 48 percent of refugees in protracted situations. Ten years later, the global refugee population stood at 9.6 million, with over 64 percent in protracted situations. Thus, at the conclusion of 2003, there were 38 protracted refugee situations involving 6.2 million refugees. While there are fewer refugees in protracted situations today than there were in the past, the number of such situations has greatly increased.

Sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest number of protracted refugee situations in one region: 22, involving a total of 2.3 million refugees. In contrast, the entire geographical area encompassing Central Asia, South West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East hosts 8 major long-term refugee populations, consisting of 2.7 million refugees. The overwhelming majority are the Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, who totaled nearly 2 million at the end of 2003. (For details, see appendix.)

Given the high number of protracted refugees’ situations, analysts and practitioners need to come up with solutions that will ultimately reduce, if not eliminate, the problem in the near future. Lessons can be drawn from the past, as there are some examples of success. Comprehensive solutions to long-term populations based on the three durable solutions — resettlement, integration and repatriation — are not new.

The issue of displaced people in Europe after 1945 was resolved through resettlement. The international response to the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis in Southeast Asia during the 1980s is a second important example. In contrast to the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese refugees (CPA), wherein resettlement was identified as the primary durable solution, the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) convened in 1989 placed the greatest emphasis on return and reintegration, supported by selected projects on local integration, as the primary durable solution.

The Case of Afghan Refugees

Afghans, who have been in Pakistan for over two decades, have found ways of earning their livelihood, but being refugees they face pressures from officials and the local people in carrying out their economic activities. They all want an end to their protracted refugee situation, but the conditions back home deter their return. The political and security situation in Pakistan remains tense, especially along the border with Afghanistan. Insecurity and restricted access to parts of the country have hampered UNHCR’s ability to assist and protect refugees.
The Geneva Accords of 1988 led to the Soviet troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 1989, which resulted in massive repatriation from Pakistan. In 1992, over 1.5 million Afghan refugees returned to their homeland. However, it was estimated that over two million had not returned, in spite of the repatriation program under way and the desire of the government and UNHCR. It was in 2000 that Pakistan started showing signs of ‘refugee fatigue’; it prevented new refugee inflows and reiterated its desire that the refugees return. The reasons given for this hard stance were declining donor assistance, security threats, including rise in crime, and the profound impact of refugees on the national budget and the labor market.

A new repatriation program was planned for the period 2002–2005. Agreements were signed and a policy adopted by the Afghan government for the dignified return of all refugees and displaced people. Within this period, over 3.5 million individuals returned from Pakistan, Iran and other hosting countries to their places of origin or other destination in Afghanistan. However, continued civil war in the country made it impossible for the entire refugee population to return, and made the situation more complex for policymakers.

Currently, around 3 million registered Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan and Iran, the majority of whom are now in their second or even third generation of displacement. In Pakistan, 74 percent of the Afghan population is under 28 years, while 71 percent of the Afghan population in Iran is aged 29 years or under. Future projections regarding the third generation suggest that the proportion of Afghans under the age of 5 years will reach 13 percent of all Afghans in Pakistan and nearly 10 percent in Iran.

UNHCR has asked for about $100 million from donors for its Afghan operations in the years 2008–2009. The agency will need over $49 million in 2008 and over $50 million in 2009 to assist 540,000 Afghan refugees who are expected to return, primarily, from neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, stated in the new funding appeal statement that “This 2008–2009 edition is the first Global Appeal to cover a two-year period. It corresponds to our new biennial budget cycle which, among other advantages, should help the predictability of funding.” The new funding appeal shows a slight decrease in UNHCR’s budget for its Afghan operations. The UNHCR had a budget of about $52 million for its refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) support activities in 2007. Repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan requires generous funding from the donor community. Whether the donor community will retain its interest in the country and the plight of refugees in the coming years is yet to be seen.

It is also believed by some Western analysts that refugee camps may serve as breeding grounds for violence and rebellious activities. This is seen to be particularly likely in the context of the “War on Terror.” The War on Terror being fought in Afghanistan, and the flawed approach it follows, have increased the possibilities that some of those resisting the Allied Forces may use refugee camps for shelter. The tribal areas have been the scene of continuing clashes between the Pakistan army, extremist elements and tribesmen linked to fighting in Afghanistan. This forced the Government of Pakistan to close down all the camps in the border area in 2005, leading to involuntary repatriation. The Pakistani government has announced that all remaining Afghan refugee camps will be closed by the end of 2009.

The proliferation in roadside bombs, suicide attacks, targeted killings, sustained and significant aerial bombing raids and military operations have destabilized Afghanistan despite the massive presence of international forces to protect and reconstruct the country. The situation puts the entire repatriation process into question, and it has earned criticism from various quarters, including human rights organizations and returnees. Resentment against the Pakistani government is increasing among locals and refugees because Afghans do not want to return to their country.

Pakistani authorities carried out a four-month countrywide campaign from October 2006 to February 2007 to register Afghans. Officials said the objective of the registration effort was to develop a basic demographic profile of the Afghan refugee population in order to manage its development, welfare and, more importantly, phased repatriation with dignity and honor. The reality was that the government and UNHCR had to come up with a policy to deal with the residual Afghan population. They needed more time to manage the population. They devised a policy to register all Afghans and provide them with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards, allowing them to stay in the country for another three years and giving the officials more time to come up with solid solutions. The process of registration involved various organizations and agencies imparting the impression that the government was bent upon repatriating refugees.

Under the $6-million registration drive funded by Pakistan, the European Commission, the United States and Britain, all Afghans above the age of five who were registered received Proof of Registration cards, valid for three years (up to 2009), recognizing them as Afghan citizens temporarily living in the country. Children under five were listed on one of their parents’ cards. UNHCR hopes that within the period of the PoR cards’ validity, it will be possible to find more durable solutions to this protracted situation. According to the registration, the word “refugee” is no longer used for Afghans; on the contrary, they are termed as “Afghan citizens,” underlining their non-refugee status. However, terminology has not changed the ground situation; unofficially, they are still regarded as refugees.

UNHCR clarified the purpose of the registration in order to remove any ambiguities in the minds of refugees. In itself, the Proof of Registration card is not a work permit or travel document. It is for identity purposes only, recognizing the bearer as an Afghan citizen temporarily living in Pakistan. It is a protection tool against harassment, but does not confer any additional rights or status. The card, which bears the fingerprint and digital photographs of the owner, is also designed to help the owner receive assistance upon return to Afghanistan.

Although registration of refugees was carried out successfully, it revealed the disturbing fact that a large number of refugees do not want to repatriate to their country under the present conditions. The majority of Afghan refugees (82 percent) registered in Pakistan said they had no intention of returning in the near future. This position was consistent for all Afghans who had arrived in Pakistan in 1979 and in succeeding years. It also echoed a similar result generated during the 2005 census. Convincing them to return will be a challenging task for Pakistan, UNHCR and the Afghan government.

Between March and mid-August 2007, more than 300,000 Afghans voluntarily repatriated from Pakistan, including more than 200,000 unregistered Afghans who returned home during a six-week grace period agreed upon by the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unregistered Afghans are considered illegal migrants in Pakistan. The Tripartite Agreement that governs the voluntary repatriation of Afghans was signed in August 2007 and is valid until the end of 2009. Although the Afghan population and the number of camps have decreased due to repatriation and camp closures, the population remaining in camps continues to need support in the areas of water, sanitation, health and basic education.

The current developments in both Pakistan and Iran indicate that the two no longer want to host the protracted refugee population and have stepped up efforts to have them repatriated. Kilian Kleinshmidt, the Assistant Representative of UNHCR in Pakistan, believes that management of population flow has always been a crucial task, which has been creating problems for all stakeholders in the refugee issue. He is of the view that, despite the difficulties of voluntary repatriation, Afghan refugees will have to go back to Afghanistan and stay there, and this will encourage others to follow suit, ultimately leading to the sustainable repatriation of all Afghan refugees from Pakistan. He, however, cautions that the absorption capacity in Afghanistan is a major challenge in the repatriation process; land, housing, water, health and employment related issues need special attention. He also stresses the need for more policy debate over the issue of Afghan refugees in Pakistan as it is creating a negative environment between the two neighbors. Thus, both Pakistan and UNHCR agree on repatriating Afghans, despite the need to look beyond the policy of repatriation in the current environment of worsening security in Afghanistan.

UNHCR launched an initiative known as “Afghanistan Plus” (Sep 2006) aimed at developing a broader policy framework within which displacement may be managed increasingly as a migration and poverty problem, rather than just a refugee situation. This shift in approach gives a completely new dimension to the presence of Afghan refugees, and is more in congruence with the concept of approaching and resolving protracted refugee situations. Four issues need to be addressed: (i) overcoming the poverty that prevents many Afghans from returning home to conditions of sustainable reintegration and economic recovery; (ii) managing the flow of persons who are moving back and forth for economic and social reasons; (iii) dealing with the absence of law; and (iv) responding to the wishes of those Afghans who have legitimate reasons for remaining in the asylum countries, and identifying those with genuine needs for continuing international protection. A shift in approach has taken place but implementation remains an elusive task for the UNHCR and donors. Continued international engagement and support will be required to develop and underpin such a transition.

With each passing year, however, it may become more difficult to encourage refugees to return voluntarily to Afghanistan. Those who were most capable of returning did so in the early years; those who remain have progressively less to return to — in terms of houses, livelihoods and family — in Afghanistan. Furthermore, maintaining the high pace of returns will require greater levels of reintegration assistance to anchor returnees in their homes and help them reestablish their lives in Afghanistan. Security will also be a major factor in population displacement within and across borders. According to UNHCR data, the refugees who have already returned to Afghanistan have spent, on average, less time in Pakistan than those who remain. This may suggest that those who left for Afghanistan in the early years did so because it was easier for them: they still had connections with Afghanistan. Those who remain, by contrast, may find it especially difficult to return to a country to which they have, relatively speaking, few ties. UNHCR, the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the Pakistani authorities are developing a needs assessment to address these ongoing refugee issues.

While all agree that eventual return is the best solution, it is likely that many refugees will remain in Pakistan for years to come. Aid workers like Graham Wood, the head of Ockenden International, Pakistan, believe that “Long-term refugee situations, like Afghans in Pakistan, require imaginative funding and program work. It is not enough to assume that people will simply go home when the wider international community says so.” This statement is rational and valuable in the present context. An effective response to the protracted refugee situation needs to be developed. Unless there is a shift from the present emphasis on repatriation towards a comprehensive approach addressing the matter as a protracted situation, the longstanding Afghan refugee problem will not be resolved. Reliance on a single solution does not work in protracted situations, therefore, it stresses on integrating voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement whenever feasible into one comprehensive approach. Furthermore, such an approach must be implemented through close cooperation among countries of origin, host states, UNHCR and its humanitarian and development partners, especially NGOs, as well as refugees.

The Way Forward

In order to comprehend the concept of the protracted refugee situation develop a comprehensive response approach, there is a need for national debate on the issue in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Policy debates are not a common norm in either country because the governments are not open to criticism. In Pakistan, the government can start the process on a small scale by arranging seminars on the issue in universities of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, bringing together academicians, refugees and practitioners to debate the issue. In the capital, UNHCR along with the European Union and other interested agencies should organize international conferences focusing on policy prescriptions. Policy debates should not only be restricted to practitioners and bureaucrats, but rather involve a wider range of actors. The greater the participation of academicians, practitioners and refugees, etc., in such events, the more input for policymakers. Critical evaluation of past flawed policies will lead to corrective measures and adoption of a comprehensive and pragmatic policy that responds to new developments. Defending its flawed policies will lead Pakistan nowhere. The initiatives should come from within and should not be proposed from outside.

The development of more systematic and structured responses to longstanding refugee problems has also been one of the stated objectives of UNHCR’s Convention Plus initiative, which focuses on comprehensive plans of actions in addressing PRSs. Afghanistan Plus has been initiated with the same purpose. UNHCR has recognized that it cannot resolve the Afghan issue alone, but it has to play a central role and make Afghanistan Plus a success story, otherwise the “4 Rs” — repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction — will remain elusive objectives, resulting in prolongation of Afghans’ stay in Pakistan. All the 4 Rs require handsome funding, which should be undertaken as a policy project by the European Union, United States, Canada and Japan.

A well-designed strategy is needed for the media to play a proactive role in highlighting the problems of refugees in a protracted situation and bring awareness and understanding amongst the people. This will have a positive effect on coping with the residual population, as PRSs do not have simple solutions and may take years to be resolved. So far, the media has been reporting developments regarding refugees, but more interest in the issue will bear positive results for all stakeholders. Refugees will feel that they are not ‘forgotten people,’ and the government will be more alert and take pragmatic measures to deal with the problems refugees face as they suffer in an apparently interminable limbo without any durable solution in sight. Donors too will become more responsive to the needs of protracted refugees. The media plays a powerful role in shaping the opinion of the public; if it plays it constructively in this context, all stakeholders will benefit.

While refugees do not have many choices when a repatriation process is under way, it is nevertheless important that when they decide to return to their country of origin after a prolonged stay outside, it should be a well-reasoned decision. Whether the decision is taken individually or in groups, it should be an intelligent one, looking into the pros and cons of return. Displacement continues if those concerned do not make appropriate decisions. Sometimes, such refugees find it difficult to face the challenges back home and try to find ways to reenter Pakistan.

Recycling of refugees is difficult to check or even detect, given the porous border between the two countries. However, all those concerned should work out the modalities of how to manage this. Partial fencing of the long border has started, and Pakistan’s government has claimed that the points fenced have brought flows there to a halt. However, fencing the border when the Afghan government does not recognize the Durand Line (the border between the two countries) is unlikely to achieve the objective. Legislation is direly needed in this respect. As no such law exists at present, population movements cannot be monitored the way Pakistan, Afghanistan and the international community desire. A thorough analysis of the problem is needed before a policy is adopted.

The Afghan government should take emergency steps to reintegrate its displaced population, otherwise the cycle of displacement will continue. The tribulations faced by a government in a post-conflict situation are understandable, but the sooner the government takes independent initiatives to address its national problems and reduce the interference of others, the sooner, hopefully, the problems of returnees will be resolved. The main concerns of refugees, regarding shelter and employment, should be given priority to attract them home. Continuing a repatriation policy without providing the basic facilities is likely to fail. There should be increased emphasis on reintegration and post-conflict recovery.

Moreover the Afghan government has to adopt a balanced and integrated approach to make repatriation durable and sustainable. The essential confidence and will of the people to overcome the present difficulties and face challenges need to come from within, instead of depending on strategies worked out in foreign lands to rebuild and reconstruct Afghanistan. While such externally made policies may have positive intentions, it is a fact that no plan imposed from outside has never worked for Afghans. Solutions must come from the Afghans, who have suffered immensely from decades of civil war.

Once they return to their homeland, Afghans should initiate a process of reconciliation, as this alone will help them to integrate better. While reconciliation is a complicated issue and it involves the will of the government and power shareholders, returnees can play a very important role in bridging the divisions that have been created by displacement and political persecution. They should try to forgive and refrain from taking revenge against those who have been responsible for their suffering and displacement. The government should take measures to involve them in the reconstruction process so that reconciliation accelerates and peace initiatives increase.

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Annex
Major Protracted Refugee Situations

Source: United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR) Annual Statistical Report 2003.

Refugee situations numbering 25,000 or more persons by the end of 2003 which have been in existence for 5 or more years. Industrialized countries are not included. Numbers rounded to two significant figures. Totals may not add up due to rounding. (UNHCR, 2004, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Protracted Refugee Situations, UNDOC EC/54/SC/CRP.14. June 10.).