Afghanistan Imbroglio: Implications for Pakistan’s Tribal Areas

Abstract
[Pakistan’s Tribal Areas have continuously been accused of harboring Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants after the US led coalition ousted Taliban regime in late 2001. Pakistani security forces are engaged in military operation in the area while, occasionally, allied forces based in Afghanistan, have attacked the local tribesmen and alleged foreign militants. Pakistan faces a policy dilemma. It is a tough decision to go for an all-out war against its own territory as losses from both sides have been colossal even in the limited operations. However, Islamabad remains under pressure to ‘do more’, being a part of international coalition. The tribal people not only suffer because of lack of basic necessities and draconian laws but are also being sandwiched by three-pronged war involving Pakistani, coalition forces and militants. The US led international community is ignoring the fact that while Pakistan has suffered a lot in ‘War on Terror’, the responsibility to prevent the militants from intruding into Pakistan has not been shared equally by the Afghan government, and the coalition. The situation calls for taking into consideration a political approach rather a military action, besides taking due care of the development needs of this impoverished territory. – Editors]

Introduction

The Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) comprise one of the important geo-strategic parts of Pakistan. Lying adjacent to the country’s north-western border with Afghanistan, this region is inhabited by the proud Pashtun tribes, which have a long history of resistance against invaders such as the British Imperialists in the nineteenth century, and, more recently, the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan.

Covering approximately 27,200 square kilometers, FATA is divided into seven regions, or “agencies,” called Khyber, Khurram, Bajaur, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Mohmand and Orakzai. Together, these agencies have an estimated population of 4.5–5 million, which is multi-ethnic and comprised of numerous tribes.

Constitutionally, FATA is a special region of Pakistan; while most of the rest of the country is governed by provincial governments under the Pakistan Penal Code, FATA is governed directly by the federal government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations. The legal and governance system for FATA is over a century old and draconian; it denies basic human rights to the people of FATA and has prevented the region from partaking in the socioeconomic development that the rest of Pakistan has seen.

Since the incidents of 9/11, and particularly after the resurgence of the Taliban in 2003–2004 against foreign troops in Afghanistan, FATA has become a focal point for the international community. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accuse the people of FATA of providing shelter and support to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Numerous operations have been conducted in FATA, both by Pakistan’s own military forces and by Allied Forces from Afghanistan. These forays have not only wreaked significant collateral damage, but have also triggered profound anti-government and anti-US sentiments. As the Pakistani government struggles to regain the loyalty of FATA’s people, it is also confronting accusations that it is deliberately not doing enough to stem the support from FATA to militants in Afghanistan.

This article takes a closer look at the sort of criticism that has been leveled against Pakistan for the role it has — or hasn’t — played in assisting the US-led Allied Forces in the ‘war against terror’ in Afghanistan. It next looks at the measures the Pakistan government and military have actually taken, and the costs these steps have entailed. The article then provides a brief description of the people at the center of the FATA crisis — the local tribal communities — outlining those historical, political and socio-cultural aspects of their lives which, on the one hand, make it difficult for them to make clear-cut choices about friends and foes, and on the other, limit the capability of the Pakistani government to take them along in its decision to support the US-led Coalition. Finally, recommendations are presented for addressing the longstanding problems of FATA’s people and thereby finding a lasting solution to the issue of their role in the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

FATA under Fire

FATA has been in the eye of a storm since the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in December 2001. Accused of providing shelter and support to Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan, local tribesmen have been embroiled in a war of attrition with Pakistani security forces, and to a limited extent, the US-led Allied Forces in Afghanistan. In recent years, scores of military operations, insurgent attacks and sniper shootings have left a long trail of death and destruction in the region.

Little insight is available on some of the major and controversial operations that have been conducted in the area. While these were mainly conducted by the Pakistani military, a few were also executed by the Allied Forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military establishment has always claimed that none of the Allied Forces’ operations were conducted without their prior knowledge, but the facts on the ground tell a different story; international laws and rules, diplomatic norms and established military procedures of cooperation between two forces have been violated. Many a times, operations in FATA were executed by American forces alone, evoking strong reactions. The backlash has had to be borne by the Pakistani military in the form of suicide bombing attacks, the targets of which have ranged from one of the military’s safest bases in Tarbela to buses transporting defense forces personnel.

Pakistan and its army are in a quandary: since FATA is a part of the federation, it cannot be the center of an all-out military operation; at the same time, being an active member of the US led coalition against terrorism, Pakistan cannot afford to look the other way when FATA’s residents are accused of supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This is especially important given that Taliban forces in Afghanistan have often shown their prowess against the weak, uncommitted and disorganized Afghan National Army.

Nonetheless, the failure to maintain law and order and security in Afghanistan gets connected to the disorder in FATA. FATA’s people are paying the price of being sandwiched between local militants, the Pakistani military and Allied forces in Afghanistan.

By the end of 2007, this disorder and ‘threat to international peace’ was not showing any signs of abating. Currently, the region remains under tight international scrutiny for al-Qaeda and Taliban activity, and Pakistan- and US-led operations continue to be carried out against these elements and their sanctuaries.

Allegations against the Government of Pakistan

From the beginning of the Karzai era in Kabul, there have been numerous occasions where Pakistan and Afghanistan have spit fire at each other for not doing enough to control terrorism in their respective territories. On December 13, 2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai singled out Pakistan as the trouble-maker, saying “I tell Pakistan to stop its animosity towards the Afghans and the Pashtoons.” He added “In reality, these (suicide) attacks are a message from the Pakistani government to scare us.” On a different occasion, Karzai complained that the problem in Afghanistan “is not Taliban; the problem is with Pakistan. If the difficulty with Pakistan is resolved, then the question of the Taliban will go away automatically.”

Although Pakistan, being the provider of logistical support to the US and Allied forces, has suffered a great deal of violence since the beginning of the Karzi government in Kabul, the international community and intelligentsia across the world see Afghanistan as the only sufferer and Pakistan, the only perpetrator. It is very noteworthy that the former US intelligence chief, John Negroponte, called FATA a main “source and center of terrorism” at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on January 11, 2007, conveniently ignoring that while Pakistan was making considerable efforts, government in Kabul has failed to share its responsibility in this connection. In the same hearing, he added that “Al-Qaeda terrorists are cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders’ secure hideout in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.”

Negroponte conceded that Pakistan as “a frontline partner in the war on terror” had captured several al-Qaeda leaders, but alleged it remained a “major source of Islamic extremism” and harbored some top terrorist leaders. Negroponte added that eliminating the haven extremists have found in Pakistan’s tribal areas is “not sufficient to end the Afghan insurgency, but is necessary.” This statement amounted to a public indict-ment of the state and government of Pakistan, flying in the face, especially, of President Musharraf, who has long been perceived as Washington’s blue-eyed boy.

President Musharraf has had to rebut such claims on more than one occasion with the reminder that controlling terrorism in Afghanistan is as much the duty of the US-led forces and the Afghan National Army as the Pakistan Army. While there is little doubt that there have been nearly 4,000 deaths because of the Taliban activities in Afghanistan, the body count in Pakistan has also risen sharply.

However, the international community appears to be deaf to these facts, and continues to suspect the sincerity of Pakistan’s involvement in the war against terror in the region. Tracing the long trail connecting global terrorism with militants based in Waziristan, one of the FATA agencies, most foreign experts and observers see Afghanistan’s growing insurgency as a consequence of Pakistani weakness, if not outright complicity, with militants in the Pashtun border areas. Allegations to this effect abound in the mainstream Western media and in the reports of various think tanks.

In a testimony before a Congressional Committee in early October 2006, a leading American expert on Afghanistan, Professor Barnett Rubin of New York University, stated: “The universal consensus on the Afghan side of the border, among Americans, military and civilian, among Europeans, military and civilian, and Afghans, military and civilian, is that the headquarters of the Taliban are in fact in Pakistan.”

Newsweek also said in one of its investigative reports that “In Ghazni and in six provinces to the south, and in other hot spots to the east, Karzai’s government barely exists outside district towns. Hard-core Taliban forces have filled the void by infiltrating from the relatively lawless tribal areas of Pakistan from where they fled at the end of 2001. Once back inside Afghanistan these committed Jihadi commanders and fighters, aided by key sympathizers who had remained behind, have raised hundreds, if not thousands, of new local recruits, many for pay.”

The Economist, too, made similar comments in its early October 2006 edition, saying:

“Waziristan is now a regional magnet. In the past six months, up to 1,000 Uzbeks, escaping the crackdown in Uzbekistan after last year’s massacre by government security forces in the town of Andijan have found sanctuary with al-Qaeda in Waziristan.”

The magazine added that all these fighters had found a safe sanctuary in FATA along with elements that are extremely close to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

As if this were not enough, the British intelligence leaked a secret report to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) hours before President Musharraf landed in London in mid-October 2006, claiming that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was secretly providing support to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The leaked document said the West had turned a blind eye to “the indirect protection of al-Qaeda and promotion of terrorism” by ISI. The memo also called for dismantling the ISI and ending army rule in Pakistan.

President Musharraf did not hide his reactions and, upon returning to Islamabad, disclosed to the international media that two joint intelligence centers were operating in both Quetta and Kabul, which were manned by officers of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (MI-6) and ISI. If the insurgents were having such a free ride, he said, it meant that “CIA is not doing its job well.” This was by far the most direct response to such allegations in the Western media. It astonished many analysts and observers, especially given the importance of keeping intelligence cooperation discrete and secure.

The Council on Foreign Relations, a reputed US think tank, also questioned the solidity of Pakistan’s involvement in the international cooperation against terrorism and said that Pakistan was not doing enough to come down hard on militants in its territory.

Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation wrote that “Pakistan” is the only word that could be used interchangeably with the Taliban insurgency. He added that “Not one senior Taliban leader has been arrested or killed in Pakistan since 2001. Pakistani forces in the predominantly Pashtun north do little to disrupt the cross-border flow of Taliban insurgents, clamp down on the cross-border drug trade, and rein in the most radical Madrassas in the region.”

The paper also quoted the US Institute of Peace report as saying that “Since the US-led invasion in 2001, Pakistan has become the chief sanctuary for remnants of the Taliban regime that previously governed Afghanistan. Some 30 members of the Taliban’s top leadership, including supreme leader Mullah Omar and the group’s 10-12 member Shura Council, are based in Pakistani strongholds, mainly Quetta, Miranshah and Peshawar.”

Over the past few months, the Pakistani government has finally taken a slightly more aggressive stance vis-à-vis the allegations coming from Afghanistan and the international community. It has emphasized the need to further strengthen cooperation between nations and their militaries, as well as reciprocity of action from all of the involved countries.

To determine whether the allegations against Pakistan hold truth or reflect a bias, two aspects need to be considered: firstly, the measures the Government of Pakistan has taken since December 2001 to assist Allied Forces in the war in Afghanistan, including the costs of these measures; and, secondly, the factors within FATA that make this region the hot spot it is today. These facets are discussed in the following two sections.

Pakistan as a Frontline Partner in the War on Terror

Pakistan agreed to cooperate with the United States in its war in Afghanistan in six areas: it allowed the United States to fly sorties from the south over Pakistani airspace, which was vital because of Iran’s unwillingness to open its airspace to US planes; it granted US troops access to select Pakistani military bases, on the condition that the bases would not be utilized for offensive operations; it provided the force protection of tens of thousands of Pakistani troops for these bases and for US ships in the Indian Ocean; it provided logistical support to the US war effort, including vast amounts of fuel for coalition aircraft and port access for the delivery of vital supplies; it deployed its own military to its western border in a mostly failed effort to cut off retreat for al-Qaeda and Taliban members fleeing Afghanistan; and, finally, Islamabad provided Washington access to Pakistani intelligence assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bulk of this cooperation continues today through the special investigation cell set up at the ISI headquarters in Islamabad, comprising of ISI and FBI officials, and through at least four regional cells in Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore.

Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001, most of the retreating Afghan Taliban and their foreign friends headed for Pakistan’s tribal areas, particularly North and South Waziristan, both of which share a very long and inhospitable border with Afghanistan’s Paktia and Paktika provinces. These provinces also provide relatively safe, vastly unguarded routes through Balochistan to Iran and the Arabian Sea. The author was told in North and South Waziristan that a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda stalwarts, like Abu Zubaida, Adil Aljazeeri, Ramzi bin al Shaiba, and Abu Faraj al-Libi, transited through Wana (South Waziristan) and Miranshah (North Waziristan) during their journey through Balochistan to Karachi and some destinations in the Gulf. Some chose to remain in Pakistan.

Pakistan began deploying troops in FATA soon after the US-led Allied Forces seized Afghanistan after ousting the Taliban in December 2001. During their flight from Afghanistan, a large number of alleged foreign al-Qaeda operatives — about 300, according to official claims — were killed in several encounters with Pakistani security forces in and around the Waziristan region. Many others were captured.

Pakistan has currently deployed about 80,000 troops and set up close to 1,000 posts along the border with Afghanistan. Of these, about 100 are located in North Waziristan alone, with very hard terrain and conditions.

By mid-March 2007, suspected Taliban had executed at least 75 people in FATA on charges of espionage for the US or Pakistani government. More than 200 pro-government tribal elders and several dozen government officials, including intelligence operatives, had also been killed. Nearly 1,000 Pakistan army and para-military troops have fallen to militant attacks.

About a hundred operations have been conducted in FATA by Pakistani as well as US troops based across the Durand Line in Afghanistan’s Paktia and Paktika provinces. Many of the operations were carried out in South Waziristan. The first of these, conducted near Wana, inflicted heavy losses on the Pakistan army. Until then, some 230 foreigners had been arrested while crossing the border and handed over to the United States.

On December 1, 2005, the Pakistan military forces attacked a village outside North Waziristan, killing a leading al-Qaeda figure, Hamza Rabia. On January 13, 2006, a similar raid was conducted on the Damadola village in Bajaur in search of Dr. Zawahiri.

The worsening situation embedded in strong resentment among tribesmen eventually forced the government into the September 5, 2006 peace deal with the militants. This was seen as a face-saver for the Pakistani government, while the international community, particularly the United States, took special interest. On more than one occasion, Washington clearly expressed its discomfort with Pakistan’s decision to ‘go soft’ on the militants in FATA. While President Musharraf boasted this deal as according to the culture of the areas, its results have been somewhat disappointing, as the continued fighting in FATA and attacks in settled districts on Pakistan’s defense forces continue. It also seems that the United States has tired of waiting for the deal to yield fruit.

Shortly after the peace deal, a strike was made on the Zamazola village in Bajaur on October 29, 2006, which tragically left about 83 students dead.

In mid-December, 2006, a large group of infiltrators crossed into Afghanistan from this area and were attacked by NATO forces. About 130 of the militants were killed, a US commander reported. Several more were killed when Pakistani forces attacked the remaining infiltrators as they fled back to Pakistan.

Pressure for a Change in Strategy

Despite its efforts, the world continued to suspect Pakistan’s will in the war on terror. Officials and tribal journalists familiar with the situation confirmed that the Waziristan region had turned into a Taliban state after the September 2006 peace deal between local authorities, tribesmen and militants in North Waziristan. As a result, the Pakistani military had abandoned broad-scale military operations in favor of negotiated peace deals with the militants over the past two years.

The pressure to change this situation began shortly after the US general elections gave Democrats a numerical majority, with which they began questioning the “unquestioned US support for the Musharraf government.” Vice President Dick Cheney was, in fact, one of the many US bigwigs to descend on Islamabad to display their displeasure over the Pakistani effort. Before him, the CIA chief, Robert Gates, and US Secretary of State Condolizza Rice had come to Islamabad with the same message. As if to confirm America’s worst fears, the Taliban left their latest calling card — a suicide bomber — at the gate of the mighty US Air Force base at Bagram, near Kabul, shortly after Mr. Cheney arrived. Over 20 people were killed, including an American and two foreigners. This kicked off another round of ‘Pakistan-bashing’ within and outside the United States. Many Pakistani policymakers termed this a mindless approach towards a “common problem” and said that conveying diplomatic concerns via the media “will not help.”

At this stage, American military and intelligence officials were of the view that despite heavy military and economic assistance, Pakistan lacked sincerity in the anti-terror war and was more interested in retaining its Taliban proxies to undermine the Coalition war against al-Qaeda and destabilize Afghanistan. Unlike President George W. Bush and his state department officials, such critics — both within the establishment and outside — had a different yardstick to measure Pakistan’s performance: the results of the more than 10 billion dollars provided to Pakistan in aid.

Resumption of US aid to Pakistan had followed the latter’s agreement to extend support to the international Coalition soon after the 9/11 attacks. According to some reports, by March 2007, 57 percent of the $10 billion had gone toward Coalition Support Funds, which are intended to reimburse US partners for their assistance in the War on Terror. Roughly 18 percent, or $1.8 billion, had gone toward security assistance, mostly on purchases of major weapons systems. Another 16 percent has gone toward budget support as direct cash transfers to the Government of Pakistan with few real accountability mechanisms built in. This left less than 10 percent for development and humanitarian assistance, including the US response to the catastrophic October 2005 earthquake in Northern Pakistan.
As a result of its agreement to deploy almost 80,000 troops along the 2,460-kilometer border with Afghanistan, Pakistan also became one of the four countries that receive budget support from the United States. Earlier, only Israel, Egypt, and Jordan had enjoyed this source of funding.

Washington also helped Pakistan in raising 12 new wings of the Frontier Corps (FC) in the province of Balochistan, which shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran, as well as a few additional wings of FC in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) for additional security along these borders. Reportedly, the United States also plans to raise more of the FC units comprising of tribal youth, to create more job opportunities for FATA’s people along with ensuring stronger security.

The New Strategy

By March 2007, over five years since Pakistan entered into the international Coalition against Terrorism, history had moved almost full circle; a few weeks after Vice President Dick Cheney’s late February (2007) visit to Islamabad, accompanied by leaks through the Pentagon and the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) that Cheney delivered a “tough message” to President General Pervez Musharraf — “doing more in the tribal areas as well as pave way for full restoration of democracy,” the Waziristan region once again sprang into the international limelight.

Journalists based in the Waziristan region say a rift had emerged between a local commander and Uzbek fighters in South Waziristan in November 2006, and both the military as well as intelligence agencies leapt to exploit the growing differences between locals and foreign militants. The latter were accused of criminal activities like extortions and murders to which they had resorted for their survival in the ever-narrowing space available for them. Local elders also alleged that rather than fighting foreign troops in Afghanistan, the Uzbek militants preferred to target pro-American Pakistanis, whether tribal elders or government members.

Early in March, a tribal lashkar (army of local tribesmen) mounted a jihad against foreign militants still hiding in the region. The target was Sheen Warsak, Azam Warsak and Kaloosha — small forested hamlets situated south of Wana, the administrative headquarters of South Waziristan — where al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, predominantly of Uzbek and Afghan origin, were dug in. After several weeks of bloody pitched battles and skirmishes beginning, Pakistan army officials reported that the tribesmen had turned the tables on foreign militants; the commander of the Pakistani troops in the tribal areas, Major General Gul Muhammad, claimed the tribal army had put down up to 200 foreign militants.

Although the numbers of fatalities reported by both sides conflicted, it had become clear by the end of this period that the Pakistan army, which had been hamstrung by sniper attacks and ambushes, and suffered heavy losses in the Waziristan region since March 2004, did play a more crucial role in these latest operations than was acknowledged. Although the controversial September 2006 deal with militants in North Waziristan had provided a “face-saver to the army,” its problems had never ended, and it had been forced to work on “like-minded” tribesmen led by Maulvi Nazir Ahmed, known for his close links to the Afghan Taliban and Arab members of al-Qaeda. With these tribesmen, the Pakistan army had eventually engineered the lashkar, and this became the face for the army’s renewed assault on Uzbeks and Arabs in the Waziristan region, which had remained perilous and practically out of bound even for Pakistanis. Foreign journalists are also not permitted to visit the tribal areas, except a few selected ones under strictly controlled visits.

“We did provide them support, there was no way around it,” said a major general. He admitted that army sharp-shooters and strategists were part of the lashkar.

Following the assault by the lashkar, military and paramilitary forces moved in swiftly to occupy strategic hilltops and ridges in areas like Sheen Warsak, Kaloosha and Tora Gola that had, until mid-March 2007, been in the hands of militants.

The operation gave the Pakistan military control over most parts around Wana, and Major General Gul Muhammad said the progress made in clearing the area of foreign militants, mainly Uzbeks and other Central Asians who have been allied with al-Qaeda, would serve as a model for similar actions in the rest of the region.

But the fact that foreign journalists saw the “vacated areas,” Azam Warsak and Sheen Warsak, from a distance of several kilometers from a military-controlled hilltop, also explained the authorities’ predicament; they were not sure whether the hamlets were clear of “miscreants” (This is the term Pakistani military officials invoke to denote al-Qaeda and Taliban militants).

On April 12, 2007, the New York Times noted that “The military has now set upon a third way to tackle the problem of militancy in its tribal regions, backing local armed tribesmen who have turned against the foreigners and their local protectors.”

Officials dealing with the tribal areas at the military’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi said the lashkar operation was part of a new strategy comprising three elements, i.e. coercive deployment, political engagement and socio-economic development, to “win over the hearts and minds of the people.”

A More Lasting Solution

So far, aid from the United States has been utilized primarily to strengthen Pakistan’s military capabilities. However, it is unlikely that this exclusive concentration on raising the armed wings of paramilitary forces will end the problem of terrorism and extremism in FATA. The fact is that terrorism or extremism are only the tip of an iceberg of poverty and deprivation; lack of social, political and economic stakes; and the resultant disappointment and disenchantment. The United States, particularly, needs to address the root causes of the growing extremism in FATA by engaging in a long-term commitment to not only alleviate the issues of poverty, deprivation and ignorance but also provide the necessary structural development to build the stakes and interests of the common people. It is certainly a welcome sign that the United States announced a development and aid package worth 750 million US dollars for the next five years, which is to be spent on the development of social and technical capacities in FATA through the creation of two Reconstruction Opportunities Zones (ROZs).

However, this will not be a simple path to tread. The hostile image of both the Pakistani military and the United States in this region makes it difficult to undertake any positive development work that might enable the local people to think differently. The high level of hostility in the region was exhibited recently in North Waziristan when medicines, food and other supplies sent by an American NGO to ensure the health of women and children in the area were burnt publicly on the orders of local Taliban leaders. Given this social hostility against ‘anything US,’ it may be imagined that asking the local people to participate in US-sponsored social and structural development will be an uphill task.

The Pakistani government also has much at stake. The large number of recent suicide attacks on government installations and public places in Pakistan underscores how those being hunted are ready to die for what they perceive as a holy cause. This is certainly a dangerous situation that needs creative socio-political management.

The chances of success would be higher if development on the ground is preceded by an effort to make hearts and minds more receptive. The United States and Pakistan should consider using modern means of communication to reach out to ordinary people in the region and gradually lead them away from a doctrine of hatred towards a life of possibilities. Even this will be a long haul and demand effort and commitment. However, it is an inevitable undertaking. The return to normalcy in FATA is in the interests of Pakistan, the United States, and the world community.

The following section describes the peculiar social, cultural and political setup of FATA and the complexities that the Pakistani government — as well as the United States — have to take into account in their effort to secure the cooperation of the local people in ridding the area of terrorism.

What Makes FATA Different and Difficult

FATA has been governed by a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) since the British colonial rulers brought it under their control in 1890.

Following numerous failed attempts to capture and tame the tribes living in this region, British colonialists drew a border called the Durand Line in 1893, which is still disputed. Thus, since well before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, this area has been treated as a special territory for governance and management: a central distinguishing factor is the principle of collective responsibility, wherein the entire locality and tribe is considered responsible for the criminal actions of its individuals.

Social Codes

The local social practices are regulated by strong and entrenched customs and traditions that are based on centuries-old dogmas, beliefs and practices. The four key sources of these are Pashtunwali, melmastia (hospitality and protection), riwaj (tradition), and badal (revenge).

Pashtunwali is the Pathans’ tribal code of social conduct. Melmastia, the second most important component of the Pakhtun honor code, makes it incumbent on local people to extend hospitality and protection to guests. This can go to embarrassing proportions; if an enemy gains entrance to his foe’s house, he can even claim asylum from the host.

Riwaj is a mixture of Islamic and local principles for the conduct of day-to-day affairs. In the case of inheritance, riwaj supercedes the Islamic injunctions. Finally, badal represents the local concept of revenge, which is to be sought regardless of the cost or consequences. This is considered an obligation on an individual or family that has been insulted or injured.

System of Governance

In 1901, British Viceroy Lord Curzon created NWFP as a new province and enforced a revised version of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) which had been in force there for more than a decade.

The system comprises of three parties: the Political Agent, the Malik and the tribesmen. The Political Agent is the pivot of the entire administrative setup in the tribal areas. He represents the federal government and serves as a bridge between the local people and the government. He is in charge of the tribes within the agency, and administers justice in accordance with local and tribal customs, without directly interfering with the domestic affairs of the tribes, which are regulated by tough unwritten codes of conduct or, more appropriately, ‘codes of honor,’ key elements of which have been outlined above. The sanctity and invability of this code of honor is cherished by the local people above all else. Someone has aptly said, “Frontier Tribes are implacable enemies should anyone violate their code of honor: Swift and merciless is the punishment that descends on the transgressor.”

The second most important pillar of governance and control are the 35,000 or so tribal elders and notables, who in turn act as a bridge between the political agent and their respective tribes whenever the situation demands. Malik is the title that the government confers on them against a symbolic currency denomination like One Rupee or Five Rupees.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation

The FCR introduced the concept of collective responsibility in FATA, which was applied for the distribution of wrath and favors in the region by the federal government. Thus, the law does not distinguish between the individual, family, locality and tribe. An individual act is taken to be the act of the entire local group. Under this arrangement, the government agreed to allow the people of FATA to carry on unlawful activities, such as, gunrunning and drug smuggling; in return, the tribesmen were expected to refrain from attacking or undermining the federal government’s authority. As a result of this policy, the areas became dens of crime and sanctuaries for criminals and fugitives from other areas of the country.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation is, in many ways, a draconian law. In Section 38 (4), it gives the local administration right to cause the death of a person against whom those portions of the FCR 1901, which are not of general application, may be forced. By permitting the killing of somebody found guilty of a heinous crime, the law opens the door to genocide.

“I find no parallel in any other existing law, which legitimizes the use of undue force as a normal administrative measure. It is the presence of this inhuman clause of law, which is responsible for there being no inquiries for the violence of the state apparatus against its own people,” says Khalid Aziz, a former Political Agent who retired as a chief civil servant and now runs a research institute.

Then, Section 38 (I) gives the right to privately arrest anyone suspected of an offence under the FCR. This is a much abused provision today; influential Maliks sometimes use it against weaker opponents.

Under Section 21 (IV), once the Political Agent has determined that a person or tribe is hostile, he may choose one of five terrible options:

• the seizure, wherever they may be found, of all or any of the members of such a tribe and of all or any property belonging to them or any of them;
• the detention in safe custody of any person or property so seized and;
• the confiscation of any such property; and may, with the like sanction by public proclamation;
• debar all or any members of the tribe from all access into British India; and
• prohibit all or any persons within the limits of British India from all inter-course or communication of any kind whatsoever, or of any specified kind with such tribe or any sections or members thereof.

Under Section 31, tribesmen cannot set up any settlement or undertake construction within 5 miles of any district of Pakistan.

Under Section 32, if a village or habitation is found dangerous on military grounds, it has to be removed. No hujra (village male guest house) can be constructed or used as such without the approval of the Political Agent under Section 33.

Under Section 40, the Political Agent can ask any one to provide security if it is determined by him that this would prevent murder or sedition. If the person made responsible fails to do so or the Political Agent finds the securities inadequate, the responsible person may be imprisoned for three years. This period of imprisonment can be extended to six years, and it is for the Political Agent to decide whether the imprisonment is to be simple or rigorous.

It is tragic that the FCR treats a tribesman as almost sub-human. Under Section 38 (4), a tribesman may be killed and no questions asked. No judicial oversight is permitted, since there is a bar to the jurisdiction of superior courts. The Political Agent and his associates can wreak havoc with the lives of individuals by either throwing them in jails on mere suspicion; penalizing them heavily; or imposing heavy fines on the entire tribe (in case of a crime in their area) under the principle of collective responsibility. To complicate matters, the administration has been enabled to enter the honor code of Pashtunwali, and has thus opened itself as a possible party against which badal can be exacted.

On the other hand, the FCR makes no allowance for the local norm of melmastia. If a tribesman or clan has provided refuge to a guest, the law permits the government to demand that they renege from their commitment to protect him. If they comply, however, their honor would be deemed tainted. Therefore, the FCR’s construct is of such a type that the Pathan is always forced to resist. And when he does so, he must be punished.

Although it has been over a century since this law was proclaimed, it is conveniently forgotten that it was basically meant to control people in FATA like slaves, and not to serve them as citizens. This practice of control continued even after Independence, and despite many claims and promises by various governments, the region remains in need of a serious uplift and assurance of an honorable life.

With such a discriminatory political dispensation, it is sheer naïveté on the part of Islamabad and the world community to expect the results that would be realistic in established and settled socio-political systems. Essentially, FATA and FCR amount to anachronisms in this cyber age; they represent a system designed by colonial rulers to suit the circumstances of more than a century ago. Khalid Aziz asked on one occasion: “…In which civilized country is the use of excessive force permitted against its people? Perhaps the Pathans are children of a lesser God!” The anguish reflected in this comment was not merely about ethnicity; it was about a human rights issue.

In the context of the ongoing war in terror, what needs to be borne in mind is that the FCR, by its very nature, is bound to evoke hatred and violence among the people of FATA. It fuels the badal tendencies of the Pathan. In the long run, it weakens the state rather than strengthening it. Today, perhaps more than ever before, it is critical that the federal and NWFP governments understand the need for change.

FATA’s Perspective on the War on Terror

When their centuries-old social codes and profound political deprivations are taken into account, it becomes easier to understand the hostile reaction of FATA’s people to the US-led crackdown against al-Qaeda and Taliban. One would have to be blind or an eternal optimist to believe that the local people could simply forgive and forget when their loved ones become mere statistics under the euphemism of collateral damage. It would be more realistic to expect them to hate those responsible and to seek revenge.

A tribal friend told this author during a visit to Wana in April 2004: “Even our brother wouldn’t know if we wanted to conceal something.” This was Allah Noor’s reply when he was asked why the political and military administration could not figure out who was taking shelter where. Allah Noor had told the author on another occasion that most of the tribesmen, being ultra-conservative and traditionalists, were loath to the idea of betrayal.

Similar opinions were expressed by a tribesman in Miranshah, as Muslims and Pashtoons, people were willing to sacrifice a lot for their honor and dignity, and these had been threatened on both sides of the Durand Line after the American invasion. He referred to scores of statements from Islamabad which spoke of terrorists and their hosts.

Most of FATA’s people are staunch believers in Islam and have a strong commitment to their code of conduct and honor. They are unable to reconcile with the new perspective in which yesterday’s heroes, the mujahidinor Taliban who drove out the Soviet invaders, are now being hunted down as terrorists.

Repulsed by the urban pragmatism reflected in Pakistan’s policy changes, disliking America, and shackled under an oppressive political and legal system, FATA has seen rising anti-government and anti-military sentiment, and some people have resorted to providing shelter and even ammunition to the militants.

Interviews with tribesmen, including educated ones, bring to light the following main lines of thinking:

• You might eliminate or arrest “terrorists” but the Islamic faith runs deep in the tribal society, which has been kept backward and ignorant by the administration for its own vested interests.
• The tribal people are straightforward, averse even to the thought of betrayal, and strangers to “pragmatism” or “enlightened moderation.” For them, al-Qaeda means standing up to the United States as staunch Muslims, and Pashtoonwali demands that “brothers under siege” must be protected.
• Importantly, the above sentiment does not necessarily translate into direct and active support of Taliban or al-Qaeda. People are generally wary of incessant government pressure and the continued army presence in the border areas, and ask why tens of thousands people should suffer for the alleged crimes of a few dozen?

FATA’s people hold al-Qaeda followers in esteem, but privately concede they would do other Muslims a great favor by moving out or abandoning their mission to save the common tribal people from the wrath of the government. Fear of reprisals also deters the common people from confronting the al-Qaeda/Taliban militants, who have begun knocking at the doors of bigger cities like Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi. Numerous suicide attacks in these cities since mid 2007 and the heightened state of security there underscores the new realities in Pakistan, i.e. that Pakistan is much more dangerous today than it was before joining the international coalition against terrorism in September 2001.

It was in this context that former governor of the NWFP, General Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, told the author in February 2007 that the tribal people have been treated like “caged monkeys” for too long and “We are responsible for their plight today.”General Orakzai possesses a thinking mind and has served in both military and civilian capacity in the tribal areas. Being from the tribal areas himself, he understands not only the plight of FATA’s people but also the root causes and reasons for the militancy that has had such a long-term negative effect on the region and its people.

Multiple factors are aggravating the overall situation in FATA, the most basic being the Pashtoon tribal codes that require “a brother to stand by another in times of need,” a Pashtoon militant told the author in early 2007. Whether any power in the world agrees or not, the Pashtoon factor in the matters of power sharing in Afghanistan has been terribly compromised over the past few years. President Hamid Karzai is himself a Pashtoon, but a clear majority of the Pashtoons in Afghanistan do not own him as “one of us”; he continues to be seen as an “American puppet,” installed to undermine the Pashtoon right to share power in Kabul. When Pashtoons are attacked from both the Pakistani and the Afghan side, militants on both sides of the Durand Line are bound to unite to face the “two common enemies”: Pakistan and the US-led coalition. Given the cultural, historical, tribal and economic ties between the people living on both side of the border, the problem of infiltration and mutual cooperation between the warring Taliban and al-Qaeda elements is bound to continue.

While Pakistan needs fresh approaches to address the issues and problems in FATA, Afghanistan and the US-led Coalition also need to look into the gaps in their political policy regarding the war against insurgents. Tribal militancy is a coherent, socially accepted and religiously motivated phenomenon. It can never be rooted out with the use of force alone. More needs to be done.

The Need for a Political Process

Although the government did sign a peace deal with tribesmen and militants in North Waziristan in September 2006, and made a similar arrangement in Bajaur in April 2007, these belated moves did little to control the damage that had already been done. They could not bridge the gulf created between the tribesmen and the authorities by the latter’s attack in late October 2006 on a seminary in Bajaur Agency, followed by a couple more such attacks that left over a hundred alleged militants dead. This mistrust has been exploited by activists supporting the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Real political reform should have followed the surgical search and surveillance operations in these areas in the aftermath of the Taliban defeat. By not integrating these areas into the federation, Pakistan squandered a golden chance for transforming FATA.

On May 12, 2007, a tribal jirga (a traditional Pushtoon gathering) representing the seven agencies of FATA was held in Peshawar and demanded an independent council to legislate for FATA.

“We, the representatives of the tribesmen, cannot legislate for their areas. We represent them in parliament. We could formulate laws for the whole of the country except FATA, therefore, the establishment of an empowered legislative council for FATA is inevitable,” Senator Hameedullah Jan Afridi was reported as saying.

James Dobbins, a former US envoy to the Afghan Northern Alliance, also offered an interesting perspective as well as advice on how to handle the situation in and around FATA. In March 2007, presenting testimony before the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, he requested a deeper study of NATO and US policies towards Afghanistan and the role of Pakistan:

“We need to address the question that if America, Europe and India can be legitimate long-distance players in Kabul, why not Pakistan, which is directly in the firing line of the blowback from Afghanistan? This will require greater Pakistani input into how to cobble a new Afghan political system and state that is adequately represented ethnically and is friendly to Pakistan without being a Talibanised state. Second, America and NATO will have to expend resources in nation-building and on creating stakeholders, not just in Afghanistan, but also in the tribal areas of Pakistan to woo people away from radicalism and extremism. Third, America and the international community will have to actively support the revival of democracy and mainstream politics in Pakistan urgently so that a greater national consensus can be developed on integrating it with the global economy and stopping it from sliding into widespread anti-Americanism, religious extremism and consequent isolation.

“If this democratization isn’t accomplished in Pakistan while the moderate and mainstream parties still have roots in the masses, extremist religious groups will fill the vacuum of opposition politics. Should that happen, Pakistan will degenerate like much of the Muslim world, ruled by military-monarchial oligarchies in which the fundamentalists are constantly trying to break down the gates of the failing state. In the event, al-Qaeda will have the last laugh.”

As Dobbins rightly pointed out, Pakistan’s tribal areas — particularly the Waziristan region — are at a crossroads. With the right combination of domestic and international policies, the region can become a bridge between Pakistan, Afghanistan and even Central Asia together with other borderlands. But poor handling of the crisis and policies based on expedience and opportunism might well backfire and result in large-scale instability. Although the tribesmen are resilient and warlike, for the moment, external influences are determining their destiny. Mere lip service to their problems will not do; nor will promises of development in which, in any case, the actual beneficiaries may be only a few individuals, including the political administrators and some very senior officials.

It must also be noted that people in FATA are now looking forward to being treated as equal citizens and not as pawns in “the great game” alone. Political involvement of ordinary people will certainly ensure the cultivation of long-term social, political and economic stakes in the system, and this will eventually help the society to slip out of the clutches of those extremists and elements who want to keep the people ‘tamed,’ ignorant and backward.

High-handed handling of the chivalrous tribesmen might undermine their allegiance to the state of Pakistan. It might not only deliver many of them into the hands of Pashtoon nationalists but also expose them to the religio-political ambitions and goals of violent pan-Islamists. In this situation, even if they are small in numbers, the people’s ability to keep the region embroiled in conflict — in the form of the sort of low-intensity guerrilla warfare being witnessed in Waziristan, for example — would ensure that the authorities are continually challenged.

The leadership needs to act swiftly and listen, not to a few thousand bureaucrats and their tribal cronies, but to the aspirations of the majority of the five million people who yearn for the abolition of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations, and an end to their treatment as sub-humans controlled by authorities through laws over a century old. It is time the anachronism of FATA was removed, and the inhabitants of this area were invited to lead honorable lives as citizens of Pakistan.

References

Financial Times, London,December 14, 2006.

BBC Online, January 11, 2007.

The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007.

The Friday Times, Lahore Issue: October 6-12, 2006.

Newsweek, October 2, 2006.

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/29/2006-09-29_pakistans _spies_aid_qaeda_brits_print.html. Accessed on 24/12 /2007

“When all else fails, call a Jirga.” The Friday Times. Lahore Issue: October 6-12, 2006.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/12/news/pakistan.php

http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/09/F5D5ECBF-B8E1-4EAE-BBB9-251CFACDAC16.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007

http://www.azadiradio.org/en/news/2006/10/931B0F7E-DD44-4707-A3C5-2B3F67B57D2D.ASP, accessed on 26/12/2007

New York Times, February 21, 2007.

Author’s interview, April 10, Rawalpindi. http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/ 07/15/business/tribal.php#end_main,27/12/07

Khalid Aziz. Paper read at Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) conference, February 2006.

Senator Hameedullah Jan Afridi, Daily Times, May 13, 2007.