Concerns over Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality
Global Concerns
An important global concern about nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities in general revolves around the potential threat of nuclear terrorism. The extent of such a threat, its use to enforce controls—both national and plurilateral—and also as a pressure point may be debated. However, the concern is real and has to be appreciated and met.
The IAEA in the context of potential nuclear terrorism has highlighted four key areas:
• Theft of a nuclear weapon
• Theft of material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device
• Theft of other radioactive material for an RDD
• Sabotage of a facility or transport
In the context of Pakistan, there have been concerns regarding the nuclear security of Pakistan in general, based on a number of assumptions. The perceived threats to Pakistan’s nuclear assets, which have been highlighted by the western media and academics, revolve around four main scenarios.
1. Extremist government in Power
2. Radicals’ take over
3. Terrorist attacks on nuclear installations
4. The insider dimension
The scenarios of an extremist government gaining power in Pakistan, or of a takeover by radical elements, were mainly projected as the gravest threat to global security in international media before the elections of 2008 in Pakistan. Furthermore, terrorist attacks and incidents within Pakistan, coupled with extremist movements and tendencies, have continuously been used as grounds for portraying the vulnerability of nuclear assets in Pakistan’s hands.
Besides the issue of security and safety of nuclear assets, concerns have also been shown regarding the proliferation of nuclear material, technology and knowledge of nuclear weapons development. The country was particularly slandered in the aftermath of the discovery of an underground nuclear proliferation network, which was, in fact, incorrectly labeled after the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Pakistan has also been projected as the only country that is halting the progress on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which, whether true or not, is deemed essential for ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
On the face of it, all these concerns and projections could seem genuine if one accepts the questionable presumption that Pakistan, being a developing country and beset by incessant incidents of terrorism and extremism, might not have the capability to put up a credible command and control system, or the aptitude to understand the importance of nuclear free world, or the resources to build credible deterrence against a fast growing adversary. Considering these global concerns, it is extremely important to delve deeper into the matter and bring the realities of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, its structure, and command and control system into the limelight.