Concerns over Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality

Pakistan’s Nuclear Safety and Security System

An examination of the evolution of nuclear safety and security system in Pakistan shows that the country is not standing still on what it has achieved in the field of safeguarding its assets and capabilities. There is a constant process of reviewing all aspects of controls with a view of improving them continually.

Institutional Framework: Pakistan has put in place a comprehensive institutional framework with the National Command Authority (NCA) at the apex for policy formulation, employment and development of strategic systems. The Prime Minister is the Chairman while the Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) is the Secretariat to the NCA. This structure makes it clear that the final authority on the use of nuclear weapons rests with the civilian chief executive and that any such decision would require detailed consideration in the NCA set up for this purpose.

The Security Division of SPD has also been significantly expanded since its inception, to maintain a close watch on all aspects and organizations of the nuclear program, with a special security emphasis on sites, activities, material management, material inventory, personnel reliability and counter intelligence. It also controls a significant armed security force—a specialized armed force—which has only recently been further augmented for physical security. There is also a training academy to impart specialized training and skills.

Then there are the Services Strategic Forces of all the three Armed Forces of the Army, Navy and Air Force. While technical, training & administrative control rests with the respective services, operational control is vested in the NCA.

There are two Committees: the Employment Control Committee and the Development Control Committee. The former, with the Foreign Minister as its Deputy Chairman, includes Minister for Defense, Minister for Interior, Minister for Finance, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC), Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and Chief of Air Staff (CAS) as its members. Others, if required, can attend by invitation. Its Secretary is the Director General of the SPD. Chairman JCSC is also the Deputy Chairman of the latter, and the COAS, the CNS, the CAS, and the Scientists who head the Strategic Organizations are its members.  DG SPD is the Secretary of this Committee as well.

Legislative Framework: There is also now the NCA Act which replaces the former NCA Ordinance, thereby continuing to give legislative cover to the administrative and executive order which set up the NCA in 2000, which in turn formalized at that time the structure put in place in 1998. The purpose of this legislation is to give cover to the NCA for complete command and control over research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and other related applications in various fields, and to provide for the safety and security of all personnel, facilities, information, installations or organizations and other activities or matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto.

In effect, the Act entrusting upon the NCA with three major areas of responsibility; (i) effective command and control of the strategic programs (ii) safety and security of strategic programs and (iii) maintenance of a system of personnel reliability. The Act has a very wide scope extending to the whole of Pakistan and applies to any person who commits an offence under the Ordinance. The application of the Ordinance is, therefore, not limited to the employees of the strategic organization only. It empowers the NCA to bring charges against any citizen of Pakistan as well as foreign nationals.

Initiatives for WMD Non-Proliferation: In the process of improving and institutionalizing the export control system, which was built on a number of longstanding ordinances, rules and practices, there have been frequent interaction with friendly countries to learn and to benefit from best practices elsewhere in export controls against WMD proliferation.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, national export controls against WMD proliferation are enjoined and reports have to be submitted. These were being studied for implementation much before the 1540 process in which Pakistan actively participated being a member of the Security Council when the resolution was negotiated and adopted. The second required national report from Pakistan had an extensive matrix requiring detailed information. Pakistan’s response to this matrix, in its second report, may be said to be a model in this respect.

The Government of Pakistan, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Missions abroad, in interactions within the UN, in the IAEA, bilaterally, in academic conferences, and with the media, has constantly projected a strong national commitment against proliferation of WMD, through command, control and custodial systems, export controls, and the institutional basis on which they rest. The SPD has also given briefings in this regard.

There are a variety of legislations which deal with the safety, security and export control in the strategic field, and these have been legislatively brought under the overarching centralized control of the NCA.

Pakistan claims its export controls being amongst the best in the world. The export controls legal framework is governed by the following legal and administrative instruments:

I.    The Import and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 Act No. XXXIX of 1950: This Act authorizes the Federal Government to prohibit, restrict or control the import or export of goods and regulate all practices and procedures connected therewith. Section 5(1) of the Act provides for penalty of an individual, without prejudice to any confiscation to which he may be liable under the provisions of the Customs Act 1969-(IV 0f 1969), as applied by sub-section (3) of this Act, as punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or  both.

II.    Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance of 1984 and Regulation of 1990 which contains provisions for control of import/export of nuclear substances and radioactive materials, extending to the  whole of Pakistan, has been further strengthened with Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2001.

III.    Pakistan’s Trade Policy 2004-05: This encompasses Import Policy Order and Export Policy Order to regulate trade on all items. These orders take into account all previous Statutory Regulation Orders (SROs) and Ordinances issued by the Government of Pakistan from time to time and regulate import and export of sensitive materials.

IV.    Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance 2000, Ordinance No. LIV of 2000: This law enables the full implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and fulfills Pakistan’s obligations under Article VII of the Convention mandating national implementing measures. This legislative framework regulates and controls the import and export of chemicals in accordance with the CWC and provides for criminal penalties in case of violations. Para 12 of the EPO 2000 pertains to export control of chemicals as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The National Authority established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the focal point for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the Ordinance. These measures constitute fulfillment of the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540 in the context of CWC.

V.    Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance (PNRA), 2001, Ordinance No. III of 2001: Under this Ordinance, PNRA issues the required ‘no objection certificate’ (NOC) for all imports and exports of any radioactive materials or radiation sources. The PNRA is responsible for controlling, regulating and supervising all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection measures in Pakistan. Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of sections 19, 20, 21, 22 or 23 of the Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years, or with a fine which may extend to one million rupees, or both. Notification SRO III (1) 2004 as amended on 16 February 2004; Nuclear Substances, Radioactive Materials and any other substance or item covered by PNRA Ordinance, 2001 (III 0f 2001); and Equipment used for production, use, or application of nuclear energy or activity, including generation of electricity and spares, are subject to NOC from PNRA as per procedure notified by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA).

In September 2004, new legislation namely, Act No. V of 2004, was enacted to provide export control on goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery systems. The Act entered into force on September23, 2004.  

Salient elements of the new Export Control Act include:

–    Controls over export, re-export, transshipment and transit of goods, technologies, material and equipment covered. Prohibition of diversion of controlled goods and technologies.
–    Wide jurisdiction (also includes Pakistanis visiting or working abroad).
–    Provides for an authority to administer rules and regulations framed under this legislation. Also provides for the establishment of an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this legislation.
–    Comprehensive control lists and catch all provisions.
–    Licensing and record keeping provisions.
–    Penal provisions: Up to 14 years imprisonment and Rs.5 million fine or both, and on conviction, offender’s property and assets, wherever they may be, shall be forfeited by the Federal Government. Right of appeal provided for.

•    For the purposes of the Export Control Act, the authority rests with the Federal Government and the Federal Government, as and when necessary, may –
a)    make such rules and regulations as are necessary for implementation of this Act;
b)    delegate authority to administer all activities under this Act to such Ministries, Division, Departments and Agencies as it may deem appropriate;
c)    establish a government Authority to administer export controls established under this Act;
d)    designate the agency or agencies authorized to enforce this Act;
e)    establish an Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of this Act; and
f)    require licenses for exports from Pakistan of goods and technology, and the re-export of goods and technology that originated in Pakistan.

•    Moreover, officials of the designated agency or agencies are authorized to inspect consignments declared for export and review, acquire or confiscate records or withholding an export license under this Act. The Federal Government may vest any investigatory powers and powers of arrest authorized by law in officials of the customs administration or other appropriate agencies.

It should also be noted that the Act provides for catch-all controls, and covers intangible transfers. Section 5(3): An exporter is under legal obligation to notify to the competent authority if the exporter is aware or suspects that the goods or technology are intended, in their entirety or in part, for use in connection with nuclear or biological weapons or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

Under the Act, the definition of ‘technology’ includes: on-the-job training, expert advice and services attached therewith. The definition of ‘services’ includes: ‘training and technical assistance including intangible transfer such as disclosure of technical data relating to the purposes of the Act’.

Under this Act in October 2005, under a Statutory Notification, the GoP notified comprehensive control lists of goods, technologies, material and equipment. These fully cover the control lists of the NSG, MTCR and the Australia Group, which are the world class gold standard in this respect.

Under the Act in 2007, the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) was set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the authority to implement the 2004 Act. SECDIV is staffed by officials from various departments and Ministries dealing with all aspects of this important task. SECDIV includes officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Ministry of Commerce, and Pakistan Customs and Customs Intelligence.

An Oversight Board to monitor the implementation of the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act No. V of 2004, and also the setting up and functioning of SECDIV, has also been set up in 2007. It has 11 members, 10 of whom are government officials in their ex-officio capacity. It is headed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Director General SECDIV is a member and acts as the Secretary to the Oversight Board. The other Members of the Board are the Additional Secretary (UN&EC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Additional Secretary (CS&M), Cabinet Division, Additional Secretary (III), Ministry of Defense, Additional Secretary (I), Ministry of Interior, Member Exports, Central Board of Revenue, Director General Security Division, National Command Authority(NCA), Director Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Executive Member, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority(PNRA), and a Pakistani Expert, with experience in export controls, serving in an honorary capacity.

Terrorist or Terrorism Threat: The holding of free and fair elections, in which the previous government was voted out of power, and replaced by major political parties at the federal and provincial level should take care of the apprehension that Pakistan’s nuclear assets may fall into the hands of radical elements.

The analysis of the command and control, custodial and export control systems shows that it is, indeed, second to none in the world. It is also not fully appreciated that unlike some of the other nuclear states, apart from technical controls and safeguards, despite being a developing country and perhaps for that reason, Pakistan can and does afford maximizing specialized personnel and troops dedicated for safeguarding its assets against internal and external threats.

Therefore, the threat of any terrorist attack on nuclear facilities to try to seize any of the assets or fissile material, in reality, does not exist. Multiple physical and personnel reliability systems, as well as inventory controls and checks, rule out any insider-outsider threats.

Pakistan has also interacted with other countries, including Japan, UK, US and the EU. While it is true that Pakistan does not need a security clearance from any quarter, it is prudent to meet international concerns, and this is the policy of every nuclear state. It is for this reason that when media hype was at its high water mark, those foreign officials and academics who were best informed, including for that matter the official spokesman of the U.S government, expressed full confidence on the safety and security of our nuclear assets.

As political stability increases, and terrorism and extremism are brought under control, such apprehensions and projections will abate. At the same time, Pakistan also needs to recognize that strengthening the democratic process and the attainment of long-term political stability are vital elements for its credibility as a responsible nuclear state.

Why this Focus on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program? The above discussion would make it easier to challenge the assumptions behind which international concern is being focused on Pakistan. The question can be asked why there is focus only on Pakistan, despite the fact that political uncertainty is largely over after the elections, and the strong safety, security and export systems are in place. Those quarters which raise concern about Pakistan in the nuclear field, do not make comparisons with the security of nuclear weapons, fissile material and nuclear facilities in other nuclear weapons states, including Russia and India, while incidents have also taken place in the United States of America.

In Russia, the threat has been much greater. It necessitated the American, Nunn-Lugar legislation for assistance for safeguarding Russian facilities and fissile material after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russian nuclear and other WMD production facilities deteriorated and some Russian scientists went abroad. There has been some leakage of fissile material. One of Russia’s leading military commanders stated that some of Russia’s suitcase nuclear bombs, designed for their Special Forces operations, had gone missing. While this was refuted by the Russian government, there are causes of concern across the spectrum. However, international attention is muted on it.

In the context of India, fissile material and nuclear weapons are arguably in greater danger. Unlike as in Pakistan, many Indian facilities are under the supervision of civilian security. There are seventeen ongoing insurgencies, which are potential terrorist threats. India has also displayed an unwillingness to engage with other countries on security practices.

Furthermore, most of the Indian power reactors were  outside IAEA safeguards. Even after the US-India nuclear deal, eight of the existing reactors remain outside safeguards, with India having the discretion of placing future reactors within or without IAEA safeguards. Since the majority of the Indian reactors have been outside safeguards, it is difficult for the international community to assess the status of past and present safety of the spent fuel generated by these reactors. India’s ambitious thirteen breeder reactors program also remains outside safeguards.

Indian scientists working in Iran have been sanctioned by the US. There have been some media reports of trans-border leakage of some fissile material, and some reports of problems in Indian reactors during their operation cycles. Information is limited due to fact that the reactors are not under IAEA safeguards, and because India ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) only relatively recently.

In the field of countering WMD proliferation, Pakistan took firm steps to deal with an instance, which came to light by quickly reacting to completely shut down the entire network as it pertained to Pakistan. This was only part of a much wider network or networks, which in fact have existed in one way or another since the dawn of the nuclear age. However, the same firm and decisive action has not been taken by other countries. Many key individuals belonging to such networks have have not been sanctioned   by the countries to which they belong or in which they operate.  

In December 2002, the then Iraqi government presented to the Security Council the full disclosure of its WMD program, in an effort to avoid serious consequences with which it had been threatened. This some over 12,600-page documentation contained details and names of the foreign suppliers and companies, which had significantly contributed to Iraq’s nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical and biological weapons programs. However, the western members of the UN Security Council directed that all names and identifications of the individuals and companies which had supplied materials, weapons and technologies for Iraq’s WMD program should be blacked out. This extensive list of about 283 individuals and companies has never been made public. The IAEA and the UN inspection teams have yet to publish the voluminous material available to them, which includes details of the contracts entered into by Iraq with foreign companies and individuals of various networks.   

A few years ago an Iraqi scientist, responsible for Iraq’s centrifuge program, has published a book which details how Iraq obtained the schematics and plans for advanced URENCO centrifuges from representatives of the MAN Company of Germany. While only a few of this Company’s representatives were responsible for such proliferation, the company itself has gone on to thrive and according to media reports, some years ago, it was purchased by the SCANIA Company’s transport Division for around $5 billion.

From the above discussion, it would be fair to conclude that either the global concerns are due to unrealistic fears of what can happen in Pakistan, or due to a deliberate campaign. Whatever the rationale, these concerns have generated suspicion that such a campaign is part of a plan to try to destabilize Pakistan and to try to neutralize Pakistan’s strategic assets and nuclear deterrent capability.