Concerns over Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality
Domestic Concerns
At the national level, following important concerns come up from time to time:
• Internal public concerns on the prioritization of scarce resources to the defense sector at a time of rising food and energy prices, inadequate delivery of Government services in education, health and civic services, as well as inflation.
• A more specialized critique that the country’s nuclear capability should lead to less spending on conventional forces and defense.
• A minority view that the nuclear capability is not required to deter India, and the alternative view that it is inadequate to deter India and will remain inadequate.
• Some critics, probably inspired by western and Indian strategists, postulate that India’s nuclear weapons capabilities and stockpiles will grow to outmatch Pakistan’s, thereby offsetting country’s deterrence. They also try to make the point that due to the lack of territorial depth, Pakistan would lack an effective second strike capability in any hypothetical nuclear exchange. This, they hold, would make the country vulnerable to limited strikes, particularly in AJK and Southern Pakistan, as well as to proxy irregular low intensity conflict. The Indian ‘Cold Start’ or “Proactive” doctrine is viewed by some as Indian credible ability to inflict territorial and political damage to Pakistan while remaining under the nuclear threshold.
• Other critics have maintained that the nuclear strategy, posture and doctrine are less transparent and need public articulation.
While it is true that the civil society in Pakistan is extremely patriotic, it is also a fact that systemic problems, which have accentuated over time, particularly weak economic planning and implementation, emerging food and energy crises, which due to rising global prices for food crops and energy supplies continue to strain the already fragile economy, requirements for improving public education, observance of the rule of law, infrastructure, internal security and the delivery service of the government, making it harder for the people in general and civil society in particular to keep track of the strategic compulsions, developments in the region, changing threat perception and analysis, and pressures of global powers and international politics. The following discussion is an effort to underscore these compulsions, constraints, and needs under which Pakistan’s nuclear program is working, and to help develop a balanced opinion on the issue at hand.
Issue of Resources and their Allocation: Regarding the debate of nuclear program and national resources, following points need to be kept in focus. Firstly, the nuclear program is not the cause of scarce or depleting resources. It rather lies in the lack of proper economic planning, issues of governance and poor allocation of resources. In fact, the nuclear program itself falls victim to these issues and at times faces inadequate resources for its plans and activities. It is only by fixing the real fundamental causes, the issue of resources can be addressed.
Secondly, a strong civil nuclear power infrastructure is increasingly becoming inevitable for the economic growth and energy security due to the limited fossil fuel reserves and increasing energy prices worldwide. There is no doubt that if Pakistan had funds to outright purchase civil nuclear power stations, the attitude of major suppliers would change over time. Therefore, it is imperative for the government to devise strategies for a fast-paced economic growth.
Thirdly, the allocation of resources is a continuing process requiring constant readjustments, by assessing all potential threats on the eastern and now western borders. No Pakistani can forget India’s policy and actions, which resulted in the 1971 dismemberment of Pakistan, and in comparison, the effectiveness of the deterrent value of Pakistan’s strategic capability that Pakistan exhibited in the wake of the 2000-2001 standoff with India. This shows that the country has acquired sufficient strategic and conventional capabilities at this time to deter India, and demonstrated the will and ability to enhance capabilities to meet future requirements. However, given limited resources, the continuing challenge for the country is to put in place an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces for any threat that may arise.
Fourthly, it is generally held that the gearing ratio for defense purposes is usually 1:3 against any offensive force in terms of conventional capabilities, whereas India is approximately 6 times larger than Pakistan in terms of population and economic resources. Therefore, for defensive objectives and to match India’s defense expenditure Pakistan needs to spend at least twice as much per capita. This leads to the simple conclusion that the economy must grow and expand at least as much as that of India in percentage terms to comfortably maintain a defensive capability, lest the country will have to sacrifice more than just an economic backlash.
Fifthly, the importance of state of the art conventional forces for defense, even in the presence of nuclear weapons, can hardly be overemphasized. A better tooth to tail ratio always remains a prime objective. For that matter, Pakistan relies a great deal on high tech arms imports, which require good relations with the major powers and subject to various conditionalities that hamper the country’s freedom of action in all fields including foreign relations. Examples of the drawbacks of such dependence in Pakistan’s history have continuously been witnessed, even at this point in time. Therefore, the challenge for Pakistan in this regard is two-fold: 1) improving indigenous conventional production—there is still room for innovative or modified approaches in this area, such as selective conscription, as in the case of many other countries including Turkey, which may become necessary and provide a partial answer for a smaller standing establishment; 2) since conventional defense also needs constant revisiting to address threats, the economy must grow in pace to the needs of ever-changing and expanding defense needs.
Last, but by no means the least, the current pressure on the resources has been accentuated by the ongoing war in Afghanistan and its spillover effect. During the last ten years, the country has paid much more economic, political and social costs than it has gained in any respect. Therefore, while the government is helping the international community and Afghan government in their endeavors of reaching a plausible solution to the Afghan imbroglio, it needs to review its policies vis-à-vis its role and participation in the Afghanistan related US War on Terror and to devise policies to put its own house in order.
Doctrinal Aspect: So far, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has been based on certain high level declaratory statements. The main elements of what has been declared are: Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state; that Pakistan believes in a policy of restraint; that it would like to avoid any arms race; and that Pakistan’s policy is to maintain a credible minimum deterrence for defensive purposes and to maintain this capability to meet all emerging eventualities.
It is also probable that if Pakistan is faced with the ultimate scenario of unbridled aggression, its targeting strategy will undoubtedly consist of a pragmatic mix of counter force and counter value targets, as is the case with targeting planners in other nuclear powers. It would also be unwise to think that theater nuclear weapons could be ruled out for Pakistan.
Furthermore, Pakistan does not subscribe to any ‘no first use’ doctrine. In respect of this strategic ambiguity, the policy is the same as that of the USA, the NATO alliance, Russia, the U.K and France. India which has a declared ‘no first use’ policy, has qualified it somewhat by declaring that it will not apply this policy if it is subject to any biological or chemical weapons attacks anywhere. Any declaration of ‘no first use’ by Pakistan could provide India encouragement and comfort for a conventional attack doctrine, given its larger conventional forces. India’s ‘Pro-active’ or ‘Cold Start’ doctrine is based on the hypothesis of being able to seize Pakistani territory in rapid military strikes while remaining under the nuclear threshold.
Pakistan has always countered suggestions by India implying the need for mutual policies of ‘no first use’ with a response that an agreement or treaty should be negotiated on ‘no first use of force’ policy and commitment by both sides. Pakistan should also try to revive negotiations held earlier on a ‘no war pact’ which would go much further than any ‘no first use’ declaration and make such an eventuality redundant by either side.
Having said that, Pakistan still needs to articulate its nuclear doctrine publicly and more clearly. Apart from the already declared elements of responsibility, restraint, against an arms race, and for a credible minimum deterrence, Pakistan should reiterate that it will never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state, and that these weapons will only be used if the existence of Pakistan and its people are at stake. This would also cover a response to any attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and assets. While the country’s capabilities have been geared to deter threats from India, the policy should also make it clear that it is also to deter threats from any other quarter that fields nuclear weapons.
Indian as a Factor: The Indian ‘Pro-active’ or ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, while representing a continuing aggressive approach and in part motivated to try to mount psychological pressure, cannot be discounted by Pakistani military planners. It may also represent a mechanism for gaining increased funding and inter service claims from the Indian Armed Services. Nevertheless, the assertion of this doctrine which is being implemented with force deployments and armor augmentation in the formations near Pakistan’s border as well as by faster mobilization plans for India’s pivot or strike forces has to be taken into account even though in bilateral discussions Indian officials continue to state that there is no such doctrine or plan.
India has also developed, as part of its long publicized policy objective a nuclear triad, a nuclear submarine based second strike capability. It intends to lease Russian nuclear Akula class submarines capable of carrying nuclear tipped cruise missiles, whose nuclear reactors also remain outside safeguards, in violation of Russia’s NPT obligations. Pakistan has no option but to develop a submarine based second strike capability of its own. This will be needed not only because of Pakistan’s lack of depth, but also because such a capability is relied upon by all the nuclear powers as the only secure long term second strike capability for deterrence.
Nevertheless, it is also a fact that when faced with the possibility of initiating any chain of events which may lead to a nuclear exchange, the political leadership of any country would not be guided by estimated calculations of the strike capability of the other side and projection of the ability to discount its impact. In other words, it is unlikely that any Indian Prime Minister would be comfortable with the hypothetical assertion of any of India’s military planners that a conventional attack against Pakistan would remain below the nuclear threshold.
Unlike India, Pakistan has been slow to develop space launch vehicle (SLV) capability, even though it has held its own in ballistic missiles technology. SLV capability gives any country not only immense peaceful uses options for development and communications, but also the ability to launch and maintain observation satellites.
CBMs with India: The nuclear and conventional Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) process has a useful linkage in the bilateral and international context. There has been some progress on both these fronts, which stand out as substantial achievements in relation to what has been achieved in the entire peace dialogue process. Two nuclear CBMs have been concluded and put in place. In the first Nuclear CBM meeting in June 2004, both sides agreed that the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability. The nuclear flashpoint perception is now over for both countries. At the same time, however, India has not been willing to discuss the longstanding proposal by Pakistan for a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR), which would incorporate strategic restraint, conventional balance and dispute settlement.
There has been some modest progress on conventional CBMs. The new hotline, put in place between the two foreign secretaries during the nuclear CBM talks, serves for a direct channel of communication for relations in general. The upgradation of the existing hotline between the Directors Generals of Military Operations of both sides also provides a faster and more reliable means of communication in case of need. Some other conventional CBMs are near finalization. These include an agreement to avoid incidents at sea between Naval vessels, and measures along the line of control.
However, now the Peace Process or Composite Dialogue with India has been resumed after it was frozen consequent to the Mumbai incident, slow progress is to be expected. The conventional CBMs proposed by Pakistan, which are either Kashmir related or for across the international border, have not been accepted by India. Apart from some positive meeting of minds on a draft Agreement to Avoid Incidents at Sea, the latest rounds of nuclear and conventional CBMs talks with India in December 2011 were disappointing.
While India projects in these talks, as it does in its national statements, that it has no aggressive or coercive designs against Pakistan despite its continuing military buildup, which is 95 percent directed against Pakistan; its military doctrine continues to be dominated by aggressive concepts, such as ‘Cold Start’ doctrine and the attendant military exercises along Pakistan’s borders. Much will depend on India deciding that better relations with Pakistan are in its long term interests and that of its image and place in the region and the world.
Post Indo-US Nuclear Agreement Scenario: As mentioned earlier, maintaining the strategic stability is essential not only for South Asia, but for international stability as well. However, as the National Command Authority inter alia noted on 2 August 2007, “the US-India Nuclear Agreement would have implications on strategic stability as it would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors. The objective of strategic stability in South Asia and the global non-proliferation regime would have been better served if the United States had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India, the two non-NPT Nuclear Weapons States, with a view to preventing a nuclear arms race in the region and promoting restraints while ensuring that the legitimate needs of both countries for civil nuclear power generation are met.”
Indeed, India’s growing nuclear potential would be a continuous challenge for Pakistan. The US-India Agreement would free India’s limited uranium reserves for fissile production. Under this agreement eight Indian CANDU reactors of 2350 MWe, which will be kept out of safeguards. If run for weapons grade plutonium production at 60 percent capacity, they could produce 1200 kg of weapon grade plutonium sufficient for 240 nuclear weapons annually. If run for electricity generation, coupled with some fissile material production due to the online fueling system of the heavy water CANDU design, these eight reactors could produce up to 500 kg of weapons grade Pu annually, sufficient for 100 nuclear weapons. The online fueling capacity of these natural uranium heavy water reactors makes them most suitable for fissile material production, whether run as dedicated facilities for this purpose or combined with power generation. Nowhere else in the world are power reactors kept outside safeguards. (See annex on page 64 for a brief analysis of the fissile production capability of 8 Indian reactors)
The ambitious Indian breeder reactor program, aiming for 13 breeder reactors will also remain outside safeguards. Indian government scientists have emphasized in their statements that keeping the breeder reactor program is essential for national security. All other breeder reactor programs in other countries have been based on Pu generated by civil power reactors utilizing Pu from fully burnt up fuel, which is not suitable for efficient nuclear weapons design. The penalty of higher natural uranium usage for weapons grade production is the main factor behind such a practice, where the objective has been to extent fuel availability and usage for greater utilization for civil power programs to surmount probable declining world uranium reserves, both proven and potential. Therefore, there is no rational justification to keep breeder programs, their reactors and the fissile material produced outside safeguards, except that India wants to keep the option of enhancing potential weapons grade fissile stocks.
In the light of US-India deal and the NSG exemptions, Pakistan has no option but to maintain a fissile production capability for the foreseeable future to meet the challenge. This strategic compulsion also explains Pakistan’s position on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which is dealt in detail in the following discussion, chiefly for two reasons: 1) to analyze whether Pakistan is the only country that is responsible for staling negotiations on FMCT, and 2) to understand the rationale behind Pakistan’s opposition to the Treaty in its current form.
