Concerns over Pakistan’s Nuclear Program Perceptions and Reality

FMCT and Pakistan
 
In the specific context of FMCT, Pakistan’s preference is for a Fissile Material Treaty or FMT. The history of this endeavor  should be kept in mind as well as the dual objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation. A fissile material cutoff was initially discussed in 1946 in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the international control of atomic energy and the Baruch Plan, which proposed to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supply of uranium and thorium and to bring it under the UN Atomic Energy Commission. American President Dwight Eisenhower stated in 1953 that the US would seek “more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes.”  

President Eisenhower officially proposed a cutoff in 1956, a suggestion the Soviets opposed. From 1978, General Assembly resolutions started calling for a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The final declaration of the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) incorporated the international near consensus to ban the production of weapon-usable fissile material as part of the measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Only in January 1989 did President Gorbachev first support this idea. However, at that time, President George H W Bush rejected the proposal for fear of undermining the US nuclear deterrence. The UK, France, Russia and India also rejected it and linked it to nuclear disarmament.

It was only in the post-Cold War period that hopes rose for general nuclear disarmament including for the negotiation of a fissile material treaty. President Clinton in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1993 said: “Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations. We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever.”  

Following on the suggestions of President Bill Clinton, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution (48/75L) in 1993, which called for a “non-discriminatory, multi-lateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This resolution touched on ‘verification’ but was silent on the question of existing stocks.

Ambassador Gerald Shannon was made a Special Coordinator in 1994 to consult the member states of UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a fissile material treaty. He soon realized that one of the critical questions would be the past production as well as the future production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. His recommendation was that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, to be established to negotiate a treaty, did not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration, inter alia, the past production of fissile materials.

In 1995, the CD established a committee to discuss the FMCT. However, despite the presentation of the Shannon mandate in 1995, the CD did not commence work on this issue. The pressure to begin negotiations increased after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998. Pakistan, after due consideration, agreed to participate in these negotiations at that time. At the end of its 1998 session, the CD did establish an Ad Hoc Committee to start negotiations on an FMT but it remained in existence for only three weeks, and held only three meetings.

Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the US/NATO bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and the US decision to deploy Anti Ballistic Missile Systems, which are also supposed to have space based weapons, China and Russia hardened their positions in the CD. China specifically insisted that there should be simultaneous negotiations on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which would cover Anti Ballistic Missile Systems.
Furthermore, Pakistan and India, which had joined the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on FMCT in August 1998, also demanded that FMCT talks be accompanied by negotiations on nuclear disarmament and outer space. This was in retaliation to the General Assembly resolution, tabled by the Western countries in October 1998, condemning both India and Pakistan for their nuclear tests. The United States inter alia also suggested to both the countries to sign a CTBT and to begin FMCT negotiations. Before either country could make up its mind on the CTBT, the treaty was rejected by the US Senate at the end of 1999. This development inevitably had an impact on the pace of discussions on any FMCT/FMT in the CD. Subsequently, there was also a change in US position, as it withdrew its support for any negotiations on FMCT which sought to include international verification in the Treaty.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference as part of the thirteen practical steps urged the CD to agree on a program of work which would include the immediate commencement of the negotiations on the basis of the Shannon mandate taking into the consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

In July 2004, the US stated that while it still supported such a treaty, it believed that effective verification was not achievable. The same year, US, UK, Israel and Palau expressed reservations on a General Assembly resolution, presented by Canada, which called for negotiations on FMCT in accordance with the Shannon mandate.

In January 2006, the non-governmental International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded to address the technical challenges of securing and reducing stockpiles of fissile material. The IPFM is composed of non-proliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapons states, who are there in their personal capacity.

In May 2006, the George W. Bush administration submitted a draft FMCT at the CD that would not contain any verification provisions; would ban new production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons for 15 years; and would enter into force with the ratification of the five established nuclear weapons states. As this draft treaty did not include verification and permitted, by default, the continued production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for non-weapons purposes, it was not found acceptable by the majority of non-western countries including by the NAM.

There was no progress on the FMCT negotiations in the CD till 2007. In March 2007, the six CD Presidents for 2007 (South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland and Syria) presented Presidential Draft Decision (PDD) (document CD/2007/L.1) in a ‘take it or leave it’ manner. It was not opened for consultations/amendments despite some delegations, including Pakistan, having called for open-ended consultations on this document in order to make it acceptable to all CD Member States.

In May 2009, the CD adopted a consensus program of work temporarily breaking the long impasse in the CD. The program of work envisaged the establishment of ‘Working Groups’ on four core issues including; Nuclear Disarmament, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and Negative Security Assurances (NSA). Since the document (CD/1863 later re-designated as CD/1864) apparently addressed the major issue of verification and suggested negotiations on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, it was supported by Pakistan at that point of time along with other states.

Pakistan, nevertheless, made it clear that CD/1863 was not a perfect document, which needed to be equitably worked out in the formal document of the work program elaboration. Formal amendments were tabled in the CD by Pakistan asking that negotiations should begin on all four core issues on the agenda of the CD on an equal negotiating basis with all having the same objectives to arrive at a treaty, and under the overarching principle of SSOD-I of equal security for all. These constructive amendments on the draft CD document elaborating the work program were rejected by the western countries.

Pakistan has maintained its position and due to the consensus rule of the CD the position remains the same and no negotiations on any FMCT have commenced. From time to time, some western countries have said that the FMCT may be taken outside the CD if this deadlock continues but in fact they are apprehensive that if this is done, other issues of great importance, particularly Negative Security Guarantees, and Nuclear Disarmament including Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit the possession, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction, would also be taken outside the CD. The Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would be a true disarmament measure, goes far beyond the status quo objectives of the P-4 and India. The NAM and the G-21 in the CD, including Pakistan, are in favor of this Convention. However, Pakistan has made it clear that the CD is the only body in which disarmament instruments should be negotiated, and if the FMCT is taken out of the CD, Pakistan will not participate.

While the G-21 have declared their support for all the four core issues on the CD agenda to be given equal treatment for negotiation, many states have put forth their reservations on FMCT. Israel opposes the Treaty, while Iran feels that it would be used as a pressure point against its safeguarded nuclear program and as another element for regime change. China also assesses that its reportedly smaller nuclear stockpile may be insufficient, given the additional capacity being provided to India.

India, in a formal statement when the consensus program of work was adopted in May 2009, specified that it would not accept an FMCT which had any adverse implication for its dedicated military program or its civil nuclear program. The head of India’s nuclear program made it clear in the public debate in India, leading up to the Indo-US nuclear deal, that without imports of uranium, India would never be able to power its ambitious civil nuclear power production program, given the small size of its proven and probable uranium reserves. However, as supplier countries are increasingly ready to provide not only nuclear technology but uranium fuel to India, it will be able to use its reserves of uranium for weapons production in its unsafeguarded power reactors, apart from its dedicated weapon grade Pu making reactors and enrichment plants.

Hence, it would be naïve to think that Pakistan is the only country that opposes the opening of negotiations on the FMCT in the CD. Many countries find it convenient to remain behind Pakistan, letting it to do the heavy lifting and attracting the flak. Yet, it is not an option for Pakistan to step back and hope that other countries will continue to block the FMCT. This was made clear in 2009 when for a short time it joined the consensus.

Pakistan’s Fundamental Considerations: Firstly, a treaty on fissile material is tied to the objectives of non-proliferation i.e. prevention of vertical or horizontal spread of nuclear weapons technology, and nuclear disarmament—cuts into the existing stocks of weapons and materials. A treaty that aims at only cutoff of the future production of fissile materials will be a non-proliferation measure whereas inclusion of the past production and existing stockpiles within the remit of the treaty will be a step towards disarmament.

Secondly, the treaty must address the question of existing stocks. The asymmetry in the stockpiles at the global and regional levels will constitute a factor of strategic instability. A cut-off in the manufacturing of fissile material must be accompanied by a mandatory program for the elimination of asymmetries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states. Such transfer of fissile material to safeguards should be made first by states with large stockpiles, both in the global and regional context.

Apart from the significant weapon grade stockpile from India’s dedicated weapons making reactors, which have been operational for decades, at least 6.8 tons of unsafeguarded plutonium, as estimated by the IPFM in 2010, constitutes another overhang. Even if this overhang was of reactor grade plutonium, the IPFM estimates that it is sufficient for 850 nuclear weapons. However, a significant portion of this unsafeguarded plutonium stockpile is likely to be weapon grade plutonium as the indigenous Indian reactors of the natural uranium—heavy water type¬—are ideal for weapon grade plutonium production, given their online refueling capability with low burn-up.

To maintain strategic deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan has to take into account existing fissile stocks. Furthermore, the existing stockpiles, unless accounted for and monitored, could be used for the development of additional nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, a treaty without an effective verification mechanism will have no teeth. It would be a soft international law at best. In September 1999, the EU declared its support for an effective verification system but subsequently dropped its reference to verification in line with the US position.

International treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament cannot be implemented properly unless they contain inbuilt and supportive provisions for verification. The IAEA safeguards regime is designed to support not only the NPT but nuclear power reactors for countries remaining outside the NPT as well. To strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime, an Additional Protocol was brought into being. There are detail verification procedures in the CWC and CTBT. The same logic would apply to any future FMT.  

Fourthly, such a treaty must be non-discriminatory. A treaty that addresses stockpiles will assist in making it non-discriminatory. Otherwise, such a flawed instrument would end up freezing asymmetries and make such a treaty inherently discriminatory and thereby lead to instability rather than the desired objective.  

Fifthly, the CD must negotiate all the four core issues on its agenda at the same time in a parallel process, giving equal priority and with the same objective of reaching international treaties for all four items.
Assessment

This analysis makes it clear that there is no credible threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets and that potential threats are under control. There are similar or higher levels of threat elsewhere. This issue should not be used by any quarter in an attempt to try to destabilize Pakistan, with the expectation that this would neutralize or erode its strategic capability.

It can also be said that international concerns from the west are closely linked to a lack of comfort at Pakistan—a Muslim state—having nuclear capability. While the so called ‘war on terror’ with its attendant occupations of Iraq and of Afghanistan have led to many adverse  consequences and transactional costs for the Muslim world, which consequently and unfortunately have generated perceptions of mistrust both in the Western and Muslim societies. These dynamics have accentuated pre-existing misgivings and impacted on the nuclear issue as well. The effect on Pakistan in terms of intensified extremist and terrorist movements, particularly from the continuing turmoil in Afghanistan, has been  immense, compounding the task for Pakistan to counter terrorist and extremist tendencies and to evolve a multidimensional strategy .

The US, NATO and ISAF would do a great service to both Afghanistan and Pakistan if they support the government of Afghanistan in implementing an effective strategy for a political settlement and a developmental package which accords with the traditional structures of the Afghan state and society, while avoiding collateral damage in its military efforts. The objective for the foreign forces should be to withdraw from Afghanistan in a manner contributing to a sustainable political settlement and without leaving Afghanistan subject to cycles of instability, fighting and chaos. Apart from Afghanistan and its long-suffering people, no other country or people have such a great stake in the stability of Afghanistan than Pakistan.

On the nuclear concerns issue, a new approach is required. Two-way confidence should be the overall objective of the international community. It should be recognized that Pakistani authorities are not complacent and are continually upgrading their systems and vigilance. Unreasonable suspicions and allegations would be counterproductive.

Presently, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not on alert status. However, if the campaign of unjustly criticizing Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security continues, there will be voices within Pakistan calling for keeping its nuclear weapons on high alert. This is not what Pakistan wants with its declared policy of restraint and credible minimum deterrence. Nor would any such change be in the interest of overall regional security and international peace and security, to which Pakistan fully subscribes.  

Regarding criticism and suspicion of Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security, a number of other important and continuing objectives need to be kept in focus. First of all, addressing global concerns is a constant process to demonstrate that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power. Maintaining political stability and countering extremism are important factors in this regard, because irrespective of very strong command and control systems, and export controls, it is the optics of these factors which fuel global concerns, motivated or otherwise. At the same time, Pakistan needs to continue  to strengthen its nuclear safety and security measures including command and control, export controls, border controls and nuclear regulation, while interacting with others to learn from their evolving best practices. This is in fact the policy of the Government of Pakistan and the policy it is pursing and implementing.

Secondly, the NCA has to constantly upgrade protection of nuclear assets from any internal and external threats. The NCA and the SPD may find it useful, as is done in other countries on important issues, to have a ‘B Team’ to assess challenges and responses to counter check what already is being done.

Thirdly, Pakistan has to project all dimensions of this issue so that any   concerns, be they from international sources or from within Pakistan, and however limited a circle they may come from, are responded to through dialogue and by projecting Pakistan’s efforts and achievements.

Fourthly, it needs to be recognized that the base of national security rests on socio-economic, educational and technological development.

Fifthly, Pakistan is, no doubt, a nuclear power, and it does not need recognition or legitimization from any quarter in this regard. As a nuclear power, it should display the self-confidence that goes with this status.