Terrorism in India: Method in Madness?

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The incidents of terrorism in India are usually seen as activities carried out by external elements, particularly the groups based in Pakistan. Whereas the classic cases of Ganga Hijacking and attack on Indian Parliament explain the fact that rather than losing something,

Policy Perspectives, Volume7 , Number2, July – December 2010

Abstract

[The incidents of terrorism in India are usually seen as activities carried out by external elements, particularly the groups based in Pakistan. Whereas the classic cases of Ganga Hijacking and attack on Indian Parliament explain the fact that rather than losing something, India gained most of the political and strategic dividends of the two incidents. An analysis of both the incidents points to two very important factors of a pattern: 1) without any clear evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in the incidents, India took aggressive military actions and used the incidents for its own political and strategic gains; 2) public sentiments of fear, hatred and resentment against the ‘belligerent neighbor’ were effectively used for getting public support to the strategic agenda. In this context, this paper seeks to analyze Ganga hijacking and attack on Indian parliament as the classic cases of bringing the two nations at the brink of war; some major terrorist incidents of the recent past in which either Pakistan or Indian Muslims were blamed; and a brief look at the year 2008 as it witnessed deadly terrorist incidents both in terms of volume and magnitude. The extraordinary context in which Mumbai attacks took place in November 2008, the Indian arrogated campaign against Pakistan in the ensuing environment, the Indian claims regarding the whole Mumbai saga, and style of investigation into the attacks also demand a thorough examination of the incident to understand the complex phenomenon of terrorism in India. – Authors.]

Introduction

The element of external involvement in the terrorist activities in India literally consumed the popular Indian discourse in the aftermath of Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 26, 2008. While the attacks were still going on at different places in Mumbai, Indian External Minister Pranab Mukherjee made a statement that some elements from Pakistan were responsible for these attacks.[1] The manner in which Indian government, political and military establishment, and media reacted to the incident, campaigning against Pakistan on all fronts—military, political and diplomatic—effectively wrapped up the four-year long composite dialogue, confidence building measures (CBMs), and backchannel diplomacy in a zero-sum outcome. The question arises whether a terrorist incident sabotaging the peace process which Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf declared as ‘irreversible’ was a natural outcome of a violent incident or in Shakespeare’s words, there is a method in madness.[2]

Interestingly, the 26/11 Mumbai incident and the case against Pakistan in its aftermath that was largely based on hypothesis in the beginning and got the international media carried away with it was not the only instance of terrorism in India that created war hysteria in South Asia. Earlier, Ganga hijacking incident in early 1970’s set the stage for the 1971 war between the two neighbors and the attack on Indian parliament in early 2000’s resulted in the largest mobilization of Indian forces after the 1971 war along Pak-India border. Since these incidents of violence have shown the capacity of exacerbating the tension to the brink of war, it is important to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in India and a deeper analysis of the terrorist incidents allegedly carried out by Pakistan.

An important aspect of Ganga hijacking case and the attack on Indian parliament is the fact that both the incidents proved to be politically and strategically more beneficial for India instead of being advantageous to Pakistan as in the aftermath of the former, India was able to achieve a strategic victory by dismembering Pakistan and the latter helped India mount effective political pressure on Pakistan for withdrawing its support to freedom movement in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK). A widely acknowledged element of criminal investigation indicates that an act of victim’s malafide should ideally be explored if the victim gets maximum benefits out of a criminal offence. Therefore, the later investigations into these two historical incidents would help understand whether Delhi was malafide or bonafide in taking serious military actions against a neighbor state on the basis of initial perceptions or hypothesis. Either scenario would help trace the pattern of Indian political actions which would provide a direction towards understanding the hype usually created by the Indian intelligence community, political leadership and media after every terrorist incident.

Another facet of the discourse on terrorism in India is the popular Indian perception that Indian Muslims have their own terrorist networks in India, which are usually sponsored by the external elements or agencies. The ‘data’ returned in the context of present international campaign against terrorism further strengthens this perception that ‘radical’ or ‘radicalized Muslims’ are the main source of violence in the world and that they have safe havens in Pakistan where such elements are trained and proliferated from.[3] This perception leaves a trail of intriguing questions that need to be thrashed out, dispassionately analyzed, and explored at length such as: whether terrorism in India is largely an external phenomenon and what is the role of Indian Muslim community and Pakistan in terrorist activities in India; whether Indian aggressive behavior after every terrorist incident is a natural reaction or it reflects some elements of national policy; and whether war hysteria, the threats of waging war or carrying out surgical strikes without carrying out proper investigation have helped in identifying the real actors and factors.

For finding the answers to these questions, this paper seeks to analyze Ganga hijacking and attack on Indian parliament as the classic cases of bringing the two nations at the brink of war; some major terrorist incidents of the recent past in which either Pakistan or Indian Muslims were blamed; and a brief look at the year 2008 as it witnessed deadly terrorist incidents both in terms of volume and magnitude. The juxtaposition of these incidents and their analysis will help answer the questions: whether there is any pattern that connects these incidents or each case has its own value judgment; and whether Mumbai attacks and the ensuing environment have any relevance to the previous incidents of such nature.

Ganga Hijacking and Attack on Indian Parliament

These two classic cases are particularly important with regard to measuring the extent to which such incidents could affect the bilateral relations. They also explain whether the alleged perpetrator state or the victim state secured most of the political and strategic dividends out of them.

On January 30, 1971, the plane en route to Jammu from Srinagar was hijacked and after sending all its passengers to India, was blown up at Lahore air port. India claimed at the time that the act was carried out by two Kashmiri individuals namely Hashim Qureshi and his cousin Ashraf Qureshi at the behest of Pakistani intelligence agencies. This incident was taken by India as bait for creating war frenzy environment and ultimately culminated in a full-scale war. However, even after 39 years the trial is still underway in a Srinagar court and the Indian claim has not been proved yet.[4]

Contrary to Indian claims of Pakistan’s involvement in the hijacking, the reports emerged that Hashim Qureshi was recruited by Indian Border Security Force (BSF) in July 1970 for spying on the Kashmiris visiting Pakistan’s High Commission in Delhi.[5] On January 22, 1971, the hijacking plan was cooked up in a meeting at Srinagar which was attended by senior Intelligence and Indian civil service officers as well as the management of Srinagar air port and was executed on January 30, 1971.[6] The former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir G M Sadiq also reinforced the idea of Indian involvement in the hijacking saga when he claimed on February 2, 1971 that one of the hijackers was an agent of Indian intelligence agency.[7]

On the pretext of this incident and using the charged public sentiments of fear and hatred, India disconnected the communication between Western and Eastern wings of Pakistan by closing its airspace on Pakistani planes flying between East and West Pakistan. Besides other factors, Indian involvement in developing anti-West Pakistan sentiments in East Pakistan and later the Indian ban on Pakistani planes also contributed to the dismemberment of Pakistan on December 16, 1971. Although this incident was not the only fundamental factor for bringing the two countries at war, it triggered the inevitable for India and strengthened its case for retaliation against Pakistan. While the idea of Indian involvement in the hijacking of its own plane may be highly contested, the way it manipulated and maneuvered the aftershocks of this incident and its readiness to use this incident as a political tool in achieving its strategic goals certainly indicate that India was not caught unawares.

Almost the same pattern was followed when Indian Parliament in Delhi was attacked by five gunmen on December 13, 2001. Importantly, then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had warned of an imminent attack on the parliament on December 12 2001,[8] yet a car full of arms and ammunition could surprisingly pass through all the security checks and the attackers had been able to execute their mission before all of them were shot dead. Unlike many a terrorist activity, the ‘five’ attackers left behind easy-to-find thick trail of evidence: “weapons, mobile phones, phone numbers, ID cards, photographs, packets of dried fruit and even a love letter.”[9] Immediately after the attack, the then Indian Home Minister L K Advani blamed Pakistan for carrying out the attack[10] and the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said, “There is credible technical evidence that the terrorist attack on the seat of democracy and sovereignty of Indian people was the handiwork of a terrorist organization based in Pakistan—Lashkar-e-Taiba.”[11] Based on these allegations, India mobilized its forces along Pak-India border and the two nuclear powers of South Asia remained eye ball to eye for almost the whole year.

Interestingly, the gruesome military activism of Indian government was not translated into a fair and transparent investigation of the incident. Even after nine years, the identity of the eliminated attackers was not made public and their number has always been a mystery. The chief whip of the Congress Party Priyaranjan Dasmunshi said that he counted six men getting out of the car in front of the parliament on the CCTV camera recording, but only five of them were killed.[12] The question arises where the sixth person has gone and why the CCTV recordings were not produced as evidence.[13]

Later, Indian authorities arrested four Indian nationals; three of them were sentenced to death and one was sentenced to five years imprisonment by the lower courts in India. However, three of the accused were later acquitted because of lack of substantial evidence and the sentence to the fourth, Afzal Guru, was upheld by the Supreme Court of India. Significantly, the death sentence to Afzal Guru was not based on ‘credible technical and legal evidences’. In its judgment on August 5 2005, the apex court admitted, “there is no evidence that he is a member of a terroristorganization …Incidentally, we may mention that even going by confessionalstatement, it is doubtful whether the membership of a terrorist gangor organization is established.”[14] Interestingly, accepting the reality that “there is and could be no direct evidence of the agreement amounting to criminal conspiracy,” the Supreme Court presented the rationale of awarding the death sentence to Afzal Guru as “the collectiveconscience of the society will be satisfied if the capital punishmentis awarded to the offender.”[15] That is why this sentence has been strongly contested even by the representatives of Indian civil society.[16]

So the Indian response to the parliament case reflects the pattern of using public sentiments of fear and hatred for political and strategic benefits. As a result of Indian hue and cry and the mobilization of its diplomatic forces, Delhi was able to gather sympathy of international community against Pakistan’s support to freedom movement in IHK and achieved its political objective of casting international pressure on Pakistan. The timing of the incident was also a significant factor as the international context of post 9/11 War on Terror provided India a conducive environment for lobbying effectively at regional and international level to club Pakistan with terrorism. On the military front, the world’s ‘largest democracy’ threatened the peace and stability of the whole region by mobilizing its forces to war footings without carrying out proper investigation to the incident. Neither Pakistan’s involvement in the attack could be traced, nor could the real culprits of the incident be arrested, but the political environment of the whole region remained hostage to mere perceptions and hypotheses.

In this context, the analysis of both the incidents points to two very important factors of a pattern: 1) without any clear evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in the incidents, India took aggressive military actions and used the incidents for its own political and strategic gains; 2) public sentiments of fear, hatred and resentment against the ‘belligerent neighbor’ were effectively used for getting public support to the strategic agenda.

In both the cases, the international community seemed to back India’s case against Pakistan without demanding substantial proofs and evidence of Pakistan’s role in these incidents. The malafide of Indian establishment in these crimes needs to be explored on two grounds: a direct involvement of Indian intelligence community and agencies as in the case of Ganga hijacking, and an indirect involvement as in the parliament case in a way that besides having prior intelligence reports of an imminent threat, the incident was apparently allowed to happen.

Ganga and Parliament cases, though the most significant ones, are not the only examples. Many other incidents also reinforce the continuity of the same pattern as a consistent approach. It would be pertinent to look into some major incidents of terrorism in recent past in which India claimed that non-state actors or intelligence agencies of Pakistan were involved, to underline the real dynamics, elements and factors behind these incidents, and to analyze the pattern of Indian behavior in the aftermath of terrorism activities in India.

Recent Major Terroristic Incidents in India

Of all the terrorist incidents in India in the recent past, the Malegaon terror incident 2008 holds the greatest significance as it effectively brought the factors behind terrorist activities in India into limelight and opened a new dimension of inquiry beyond the much publicized conspiracy theories of the involvement of Pakistan, Indian Muslims or their nexus behind such incidences in India. So it is important to briefly discuss Malegaon case.

On September 29, 2008, two bombs went off near Bhikko Chowk in a predominantly Muslim majority city, Malegaon, in Maharashtra.[17] Astonishingly, the two explosions were only tip of the iceberg as 17 more bombs were planted in various parts of Kalupur region of Ahmedabad, the largest city in the state of Gujarat on the same day (September 29), just a day before the start of Navaratri—the biggest religious festival of Gujarat.[18] Fortunately, these bombs had been detected before they went off. Since the festival is generally heavily crowded and celebrated throughout the state, had the 17 bombs exploded, it would have faced a great tragedy.

The investigations on Malegaon blasts conducted by Maharashtra Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) concluded that the accused,[19] including the serving colonel in Indian Army Lieutenant Col Shrikant Prasad Purohit,[20] Major Kulkarni,[21] retired Major Ramesh Upadhyay and Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur,[22] had their close association with extremist Hindu organizations and their involvement in other terror incidents recently occurred in India.

This was for the first time in Indian history that such a coordinated Hindu extremist network of terrorism with its links with the military was discovered. Later, the investigations led by Hemant Karkare, Cheif of the Maharashtra ATS, gradually unfolded a number of important dimensions of the network and it was expected that the Malegaon accused might lead to some other terror groups in the country but Hamant Karare was killed in 26/11 Mumbai attacks that proved a great setback for further progress in this case.

Raghuvanshi, the new investigation officer as the successor of Hemant Karkare, was a close friend of the prime suspect of the case—Col. Purohit[23] —and his appointment as investigation officer in this case deepened the suspicion that Indian authorities might want to keep the recently discovered military-Hinduvta nexus under wraps. Consequently, the charge sheet filed by ATS headed by Raghuvanshi on January 20, 2009 ignores the wider Hindu terrorist network, as it does not talk about the role of Hindu extremist organizations and institutions, including Abhinav Bharat (AB) and Bhonsala Military School, and it seemingly separates the Hindu extremist individuals and IB officers involved in the Malegaon blasts including Mithan Chakrawarty, former IB officer and an expert of bomb making; Himani Savarkar, president of AB; Shamaro Apte, leader of Vishwa Hindu Preshid; Milind Ekbote, former BJP Corporator; Jayant Chitale, retired colonel; and two professors of history,.[24]

The involvement of serving as well as retired military officers in the terror incidents in India, and their association with the Hindu extremist organizations of political lineage expose the fact that Indian establishment could use terror incidents in its own country for larger internal or external objectives. Samjhauta Express tragedy and blasts in Hyderabad Mecca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif Dargah and the Cinema Halls in Ludhiana are some other examples of the incidents of such kind.

Samjhauta Express came under attack at Diwana station near Panipat some 90 kilometers from the north of Delhi on February 18, 2007 around midnight.[25] Indian police Inspector-General Sharad Kumar claimed that a Pakistani confessed to have thrown the suitcase on the track which caused the explosions[26] and after two weeks, on March 6, 2007 during the first meeting of the India Pakistan Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism the government of India handed over the photographs of the suspected Pakistani nationals who were allegedly been involved in the Samjhauta tragedy. Indian authorities gave the impression that Pakistan’s ISI was behind this terror incident in which a sizeable number of the victims were Pakistani nationals. Indian opposition party BJP also petitioned the Indian government to ask Pakistan to comply with the promise of 2004 to stop cross border infiltration.[27] There were strong forces and voices in India that tried to derail the peace process by asking the Indian government to condition the composite dialogue with Islamabad’s seizure on ‘infiltrating terrorism’ in India.[28]

However, this notion was completely dispelled when Col. Purohit, the prime accused in the Malegaon case, confessed before the ATS during the narco analysis test that he provided the explosive material used in the Samjhauta blasts.[29] The Indian army’s Court of inquiry has also declared Col. Purohit an offender in the blast and his court-martial is on the cards. So the Samjuhata Express tragedy not only dispelled the alleged involvement of Pakistan’s agencies or groups but emphasized the lethality of the threat emanating from inside elements belonging to Hindu terrorist network.

The same network was involved in the bomb blast in Hyderabad Mecca Masjid, one of the oldest and biggest mosques in India, where thousands of Muslims were present for Friday prayer on May 18, 2007. The explosion killed 14 people.[30] The Home Minister K Jana Reddy said that it could be an act of the foreign elements.[31] However, it was discovered in the Malegaon investigations that the perpetrators of this act were the same domestic elements who were involved in the Malegaon blast.[32] Moreover, Col. Purohit, the prime suspect of Malegaon blast, confessed that he had provided RDX to the Sangh Parivar for causing blasts in Mecca Masjid. It is also important to mention here two bomb explosions in a popular restaurant in Hyderabad, capital of Andhra Pradesh on May 26, 2007. Right after the incident, the state Chief Minister Y S Rajasekhara Reddy drew similarities of these two blasts with the terrorist activity in Hydrabad Mecca Masjid, an act facilitated by Col. Purohit, but at the same time said there were Bangladeshi and Pakistani connections to the twin explosions.[33]

It is also significant to note here that on the very next day of Mecca Masjid blast, the Indian police recovered 19 bombs from various thickly populated places in Hyderabad,[34] which indicates that a very systematic and well coordinated terror plan was hatched in one of the most populated cities in India that has the largest Muslim community in the state of Andhra Pradesh. In addition, on May 3, 2010 the Central Bureau of Investigation also confirmed that Mecca Masjid blasts and Ajmer Sharif bombings were linked.[35]

The Ajmer Sharif Dargah blast[36] occurred on October 11, 2007 inside the dargah, situated in Ajmer District in Rajasthan state. Interestingly, the Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil as well as Home Secretary accused Pakistan for carrying out the incident.[37] However, Malegaon investigations revealed that the attack was planned and executed by the Hindu terrorist organization—Abhinev Bharat.[38]

Another incident of bomb blast in Cinema Halls[39] in Ludhiana, Punjab on October 14, 2007 was blamed on Pakistan and Indian Muslims,[40] but later on December 30, 2007, the Punjab police arrested Gurpreet Singh saying he was the mastermind of Ludhiana blast and seized a huge amount of explosives from him.[41]

Although the incidents of Samjhauta Express tragedy and bombing in Mecca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif Dargah and Ludhiana were carried out by a particular group of Hindu terrorists, the investigations of many other incidents of violence make it clear that there are many such groups or networks of groups, operating in India. The brief information of the terrorist incidents in India in 2008 in the following two tables also points to the actors and factors behind the violent and terroristic activities. The list includes incidents of two kinds: the incidents which were executed successfully and the ones which were thwarted by the security agencies.

The Terrorist Incidents – Executed in 2008

Date	Incident	Victims		Investigations and Comments
Date	Incident	C	I	Investigations and Comments
Jan 4, 2008	Bomb blast at Gadkari Rangayatan theatre in Mumbai	0	7	Sanatan Sanstha and Hindu Janagruti Samiti carried out the blast.[42]
May 13, 2008	8 coordinated blasts at Jaipur	60	50	LeT accused, 500 Muslims were arrested but none was proved guilty.[43]
Jun 4, 2008	Bomb blasts at Gadkari Rangayatan theatre, Thane, Maharshtra	0	7	Janjagaran Samiti carried out the attack.[44]
Jul 25, 2008	A series of nine explosions in Bangalore.	2	20	Indian intelligence Bureau accused LeT and (Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)[45] but it has not been proved. Nevertheless, the modus operandi of this incident was similar to the incidents occurred in Malegaon and Hyderabad.[46]
Jul 26, 2008	A series of 21 bomb blasts in Ahmadabad, Gujarat.[47]	56	256	Five minutes after the blasts Indian TV channels reported a threatening email from an American citizen, Ken Haywood who was declared as a suspect, and came under investigation but he mysteriously left the country.[48] Later, police arrested sixty Muslims[49] including SIMI activist, Maulvi Abdul Halim Shamsullah Khan Pathan,[50] who was later acquitted,[51] and the involvement of rest of the detainees could not be proved as well.[52] Surprisingly, nine months after the blasts the Ahmedabad City Detection of Crime Branch (DCB) said the blasts had a direct link with LeT[53] but these claims could not be substantiated with the evidence.
Aug 20, 2008	A grenade blast in Thangal Bazar in Imphal, a district of Manipur.	0	5	Jawan of India Reserve Battalion (IRB) was held responsible. In addition, the accused also confessed to have been involved in two other blasts at Shanti Hospital on July 27, 2008 and Langol View Clinic on July 28, 2008 both in Imphal at the behest of the militant outfit Kangleipak Communist Party-Military Council (KCP-MC).[54]
Aug 24, 2008	An explosion occurred in Kanpur while two Bajrang Dal[55] activists were making a bomb.[56]	2	0	The ATS of Maharashtra and Rajasthan accused Swami Asimanand of supplying the explosives and the other material to the youths. “The Uttar Pradesh ATS is … looking into the role of a Kanpur-based leader of a Hindu outfit who was close to the Bajrang Dal activists and was also in touch with Swami Asimanand.”[57]
Oct 1, 2008	A series of Five bomb blasts in various crowded places in Agartala, capital of Tripura.[58]	3	120	Indian security authorities accused the external elements particularly ISI of Pakistan and Bangladesh based Harkatul Jihad Al Islami (HuJI).[59] Later, members of the banned All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)[60] were held responsible by Crime Investigation Department (CID) for this incident.[61]

C=Casualties, I=Injuries

The Terrorist Incidents – Thwarted in 2008

Date	Incident	Comments
January 24, 2008	A bomb blast occurred at RSS office at Tenkasi, in the Tirunelveli district of Tamil Nadu. Since nobody was present at the office, no causality occurred however 14 pipe bombs were recovered on the spot.	Sangh Parivar activists confessed that they had indulged in this terror act to instigate the local Hindu population against the Muslims.[62]
April 17, 2008	Malegaon police recovered a huge explosive material including, RDX revolver and 1000 rupees fake currency notes from a pathology laboratory at Malegaon, Maharashtra.	The owner of the laboratory and all of his accomplices in this act belonged to RSS.[63]
June 16, 2008	Two Hindus, Ramesh Hanumant Gadkaki and Mangesh Dinkar Nikam were arrested by Anti-Terrorism Squad of Maharashtra for planting crude bombs at Vishnudas Bhave Auditorium.	The terrorists were Jan Jagruti Samiti activists. Earlier, they had also blasted a mosque in 2007.[64]
July 5, 2008	A huge amount of explosive material which includes 365 electronic detononatrs, 400 gelatin sticks, battery holders a tractor with 10 detonators and 10 gelatin sticks were recovered from Nanded, Maharashtra.[65]	The two RSS workers Mohan Lal Hardeoji and Bhor Lal Bhagsu were arrested red handed.[66]
August 2, 2008	Three live bombs were recovered from a Sadhu like person Nankaoo Das in Faizabad court.	This incident was downplayed both by Indian media as well as the police and other security authorities, and resultantly it is difficult to find detailed information regarding the culprit.
August 25, 2008	The huge explosive material recovered from the inside of a hostel in Kalyanpur area of Kanpur, about 80 km from Lucknow.	The material was seized from a spot in Kanpur where two Bajrang Dal activists while making bomb on August 24, 2008.[67]
August 27, 2008	29 bombs and two cars laden with explosives in Surat were recovered.	Since the Director General of Police P. C Pande also observed that Ahmedabad blast and Surat bombs were linked together,[68] it seemed that a big terror plot had been hatched to cause huge human and material loss.
September 29, 2008	Highly explosive material stacked in 14 sacks was recovered from Rajesh Kumar in a remote village of Allahabad, a city in Utter Pradesh.[69]	During interrogation, Rajesh revealed that he worked for some Gulab Singh Patel. Although the police ruled out the possibility of any subversive activity behind this incident, it seems strange in the backdrop of a low-intensity bomb blast in Delhi two days ago and coordinated bombings on September 13, 2008.[70]

Although the number of terrorist incidents significantly decreased and no major terrorist incident happened in India in 2009 apparently in the wake of the disclosures made by the accused of Malegaon blast, there are two verdicts of Indian courts of 2009 on the terrorist incidents that also endorse the operational force of Hindu terrorist elements and their implications on national and regional politics.

The first verdict was given on the Thane blast case by the Sewree Fast Track Court on January 15, 2009. The court accepted all the charges put up by the prosecution against six accused for blasts at auditoriums in Thane and Vashi and a movie theatre in Panvel.[71] All the six accused belonged to Hindu extremist organization Janjagaran Samiti (HJS), an outfit of Sanatana Sanstha.

In the second verdict, Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act (MCOCA) court acquitted Sadiq Sheikh on May 12, 2009 from his alleged involvement in the July 11, 2006 (11/7) Mumbai train bombings.[72] The horrible Mumbai Attack (2006) killed 209 people and injured 700. The Mumbai police had claimed that Sadiq Sheikh, an Indian national, was the prime accused who hatched the conspiracy of blasts with the help of his Pakistani friend Amir Raza. Indian authorities had also accused ISI and LeT for sponsoring the attack[73] and the police even went a step ahead saying Sheikh ‘had visited Pakistan in 2004 and received nine months’ training in handling arms and explosives in LeT camps.[74]

It may be recalled that in the backdrop of 11/7, the Indian government made an effort to create a hostile environment that could ultimately lead to the halt of peace process between India and Pakistan.[75] The respective diplomats were expelled and fiery statements were issued. However, an effective diplomatic response from Pakistan, back channel closed door meetings, and international pressure made it possible for both the countries to continue the dialogues. However, while the 11/7 Mumbai incident could not derail the peace process, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks effectively could.[76]

All these terrorist incidents and court verdicts indicate three very important factors regarding the issue of terrorism in India. Firstly, keeping in mind the unsettled dispute over Kashmir and history of antagonism between Pakistan and India, and the tension between Hindu majority and significant Muslim minority in India; the possibility of both India and Pakistan carrying out violent activities in each other’s lands at one time or another cannot be ruled out. Yet, the involvement of extremist Hindu elements in terrorist activities and their liaison with Indian military and political establishment is more dangerous and lethal as their nationwide network backed by politico-military connections may obscure the causes and real culprits of violent activities. Secondly, military-Hinduvta nexus is in a position to design, facilitate and execute terrorist incidents for larger political and strategic gains. Thirdly, seeing the Indian track record of taking military actions in the aftermath of such incidents without carrying out proper investigation, the presence of military-Hinduvta nexus becomes a great threat to regional peace and harmony. Keeping this backdrop in mind, the dynamics of 26/11 Mumbai attacks need to be analyzed.

Mumbai Attacks 2008

The mysterious incident of Mumbai attacks, though very sad and tragic, presented a scene of some Bollywood action movie in Indian claims that ten young terrorists crossed the Indian Ocean, passing through the check points of Indian Navy busy in exercises of countering maritime terrorist attacks. Entering Mumbai, they travelled through the city with their arms and ammunition, reached Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Trident Hotels, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, CST_ CAMA hospital, Nariman House, and Cafe Leopold, and held Indian government, agencies and security forces hostage for almost sixty long hours. Later, the security forces were able to kill nine of the terrorists, whose identity has not been made public as yet, and conveniently, the CCTV footages are found only of the lone survivor, Ajmal Kasab.[77] Repeating the same ‘mistake’ as committed by the ‘terrorists’ in Parliament case allegedly belonging to the same group, the ‘trained terrorists’ of Mumbai attack left behind trails of evidence—the trawler with marking on its engine of a company based in Lahore, a bottle of Dew packed in Karachi, pistols bearing markings of a gun manufacturer in Peshawar and other Pakistani made items like a match box, detergent powder and shaving cream—[78] for the Indian police to develop a strong case against the lone survivor and the groups in Pakistan.

Right from the beginning, the Indian media took the lead in demonizing Pakistani government, agencies and religious groups. The Indian authorities, political and military establishment, and civil society organizations diligently played their role in building case against the neighboring state without waiting for the results of fair and transparent inquiry into the attacks. The ultimate result of the Indian outrage was the suspension of the four-year long peace process which makes it rather important to see the context in which Mumbai incidents took place.

The indigenous peaceful character of uprising in Kashmir about five months before Mumbai attacks had its toll on Indian government as the emergence of democratic force of fourth generation of Kashmiris under Indian occupation showed: the potency of keeping the future struggle of freedom movement alive; a shift from militancy or counter-militancy to the political course of action; and a vibrancy of influencing the coming elections in India and IHK, and the changed situation in Pakistan.[79] Another important factor in this context is the defame of Indian nation because of the Hinduvta violence against Christians in Orissa about six months before the Mumbai attacks that led to the focus of international media on the term ‘Hindu terrorism’.[80]

Notably, the connection between terrorism in India and peace process between India and Pakistan also needs to be kept in mind while discussing Mumbai incident. The first serious meeting between India and Pakistan after Kargil crisis, Agra Summit, in July 2001 was subverted admittedly by BJP leader, Lal Krishna Advani.[81] A few months later, Parliament attack took place that further distanced the two countries from dialogue for next three years. In the subsequent two years of composite dialogues since 2004, the two sides came closer to the agreement of demilitarization of Siachin glacier[82] when two attacks in Srinagar in May 2006[83] and Mumbai train bombings just nine days before the Foreign Secretaries meeting[84] in July 2006 halted any kind of talks for several months. Resumed dialogues in 2007 made considerable progress on Wullar Barrage dispute and Sir Creek issue which were again derailed because of Samjhota Express tragedy, and series of bomb blasts in many Indian cities including Hyderabad, Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, and Delhi.

The near conclusiveness of the four-year long Pak-India composite dialogues on key issues between the two countries is evident from the de facto acknowledgement of Indian government that Kashmir is an issue that needs to be resolved,[85] and the statement of former Foreign Minister of Pakistan that both the countries had reached close to the resolution of Kashmir dispute through peace process,[86] are important dimensions in this regard. However, the deadly 26/11 terrorist attacks held hostage the talks for the longest period of time since 2001. The Indian government’s efforts of averting the focus of bilateral talks from composite dialogues to the issue of terrorism[87] and BJP’s walkout from Lok Sabha after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s announcement of the decision of resuming talks with Pakistan[88] should also be seen in the same context while analyzing the Mumbai attacks.

Although the lone survivor of the Mumbai attack perpetrator, Ajmal Kasab, received capital punishment by the special court of M L Tahaliyani on four counts including waging war against the nation, murder, criminal conspiracy and committing terror activities on May 6, 2010,[89] the case is far from being closed since there are so many unanswered questions regarding the whole episode as well as the trial of Ajmal Kasab.

One of the most important factors is the involvement of an American national, David Headley, who was arrested by FBI from the Chicago airport on October 3, 2009 and was accused of masterminding the Mumbai attack.[90] Headley had been convicted of heroin smuggling in 1998 and remained in jail for 15 months. Later, he worked for America’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and remained under the surveillance of US authorities.[91] It is interesting to note here that the US had warned the Indian authorities twice almost a month before the incident about the potential maritime attack on Mumbai.[92] Whether there could be any implicit connection between the US agencies, David Headley and the Mumbai attacks is still a mystery. Although there may be many interpretations of the seemingly unpreparedness of Indian security forces particularly when they had received prior warning of the attack, one strong possibility is that the authorities let the incident happen deliberately.

Another factor of great significance is the obscurities surrounding the actual incident and the case of Ajmal Kasab. To start with, the so-called terrorists were marathi-speaking persons[93] from Satara district of Maharashtra carrying SIM cards having Maharashtra connection.[94] The 16 CCTV camera footages also shrouded in mystery as initially it was said that the railway and other officials had the images but later it was stated that the cameras were not working on the day of the attack.[95] Similarly, it is not clear how only ten people could hold hostage Mumbai—the economic backbone of India—the entire Indian government, agencies and Navy for sixty long hours without any local assistance from India.

The killing of Hemant Karkare is another significant aspect of Mumbai incident because the report submitted during the trial says that bullets recovered from the bodies of Karkare had been fired from the AK-47 rifle of Kasab.[96] However, the tension between fundamentalist Hindu leadership and ATS chief cannot be ignored in this regard. Since ATS captured the Hindu activists in the backdrop of bombings and terrorist activities in India and exposed the Hindu terror network, the Shiv Sena, RSS and BJP had been questioning Hemant Karkare’s integrity, mounting political pressure on him in terms of blaming him for torturing the Malegaon accused and alleging him for working against one political force on the behest of another.[97] His wife, Kavita Karkare, also raised some pertinent questions such as ‘why Karkare did not receive reinforcement immediately, why he was not picked up from the spot for forty minutes after having been shot, and where his bullet proof jacket went missing.’[98] It has also been reported that Mumbai police was headed by Anti-Karkare elements during the Mumbai carnage. Keeping these dimensions in mind, the assassination of Karkare seems to be a deeper issue and cannot be squared with the Mumbai saga alone.

The former IG Police Maharashtra, S M Mushrif, deliberates on the mystery of keeping one terrorist alive as: “The reason why the planners scripted to keep one of the ‘terrorists’ alive could be that they had not expected that the real terrorists would leave some trails behind, in which case it would have been difficult for them to connect the ‘terrorists’ in the CST_CAMA-Rangabhavan section to LeT and Pakistan, and serious doubts would have been raised about the origin of the terrorists who killed Karkare. Therefore, to be on the safer side, they kept a ‘terrorist’ alive so that they could prove whatever they wished to, by way of his ‘confessional statement’, or ‘recoveries’ from him or by manipulating physical clues like fingerprints or DNA samples and so on.’^{^[99]}

Therefore, reading the Mumbai attacks along with the terrorist activities in India in which Pakistan was initially blamed in the past, it seems that the details under the surface may be much more than what meet the eye. The Indian authorities, security forces, investigation teams, and the judiciary need to bring the real facts out in the open so that incidents of this nature could be thwarted in future. The mysteries and confusions prevalent in this case need to be sorted out before any side—India or Pakistan—form any concrete approach or policy as to who should be held responsible. The way India tried to use this particular incident for some political and strategic advantages against Pakistan, as it did in the aftermath of Ganga hijacking, attack on parliament and 7/11 Mumbai blast; it portrays Indian malafide of some sort on the surface.

Conclusion

The violent incidents are, no doubt, a grave threat to human security and the necessary measures need to be taken to eliminate them but it is not less important to examine the political and strategic objectives obtained through these incidents. It has been surprisingly but certainly observed that some of the victim states are the great beneficiaries of these incidents and it by and large seems true in case of India.

From the classic cases of Ganga hijacking and parliament incident down to the recent major incidents of terrorism in India including Samjhauta Express tragedy, bomb blasts in Hydrabad Mecca Masjid, Ajmer Sharif Dargah, and Cinema halls in Ludhiana, and the incidents of terrorism in 2008, a pattern of Indian political and military behavior can easily be observed that the world’s largest secular democracy manipulates and at times exploits the initial moments of public fear and hatred for achieving its internal or external political objectives. The exposure of military-Hinduvta nexus and their activism in carrying out acts of terrorism for political and strategic interests explain the inside actors and factors that India would use for creating violence within with the purpose of using them without. An element of this kind seems to have played a very active and important role in Indian national policy during the 26/11 Mumbai incident.

The extraordinary context in which Mumbai attacks took place and the Indian arrogated campaign against Pakistan reaffirm the pattern of ignoring the real actors and factors behind these attacks and achieving political, strategic and diplomatic objectives out of them. This attitude ultimately results in the sustenance of the causes and elements of terrorism. Although the public outrage, fear and hatred make it easier for the state to achieve local or regional political objectives, the bilateral relationship can never get strong in spite of keeping both the countries engaged in CBMs, peace initiatives and dialogues. A deplorable, yet understandable, fact is that Indian authorities do not seem to be making any substantial efforts in comprehending the real threat and bringing the facts out to the world.

The soaring violence in India should be a matter of due concern not only for Indians but for Pakistanis as well, because violent incidents in India have profound bearing on Pak-India relations; and as it has been witnessed in the past, they have the potential of provoking an all out war between the two countries. Given the wars-ridden past and constantly strained relations between Pakistan and India this possibility cannot be outrightly rejected that either of the country may involve or has some share in the violent incidents in the other country. However, to see every violent incident through the prism of proxy war is not a judicious approach either. In this context, India needs to realize the threats emanating from within the country and instead of overlooking them, it should look them over and take necessary measures to deal with them effectively or else the threats might push India to the war fronts again.

The role of American citizens, Ken Haywood in bomb blasts in Ahmadabad, Gujarat and David Headley in 26/11 Mumbai incident; the statement of US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates that “It is not reasonable to assume that Indian patience is unlimited in case of another attack … [by] “a syndicate of terrorist group … Al Qaeda, the Tehreek-e-Taliban, Pakistan and the Lashkar-e-Toiba,”[100] and the Indian intelligence report of “a plot by militants linked to al Qaeda and the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba group to hijack an Air India or Indian Airlines flight” just after two days of Robert Gates warning[101] make this pattern even more intriguing.

In this backdrop, the role of international community in general and big powers in particular is very important as the Indian diplomatic and media campaign, the thrust of transforming hypotheses and perceptions into reality, and garnering their support to its war-mongering behavior has generally been able to convince them of the ‘plight’ of Indian government and people. It needs to be realized that if the pattern that the Indian politico-military establishments have been following to secure their political and strategic interests becomes a norm of international politics; the causes, actors and factors, and the solution to the problem of terrorism will remain obscure, resulting in making the future generations insecure.

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[1] Swaine, “Mumbai attack: British men ‘among the terrorists.”

[2] Rahman, “Opening Remarks: Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future Scenario.”

[3] Most recent example of the global gaze on ‘Islamist terrorist network working from the tribal areas of Pakistan’ is the case of Faisal Shahzad, an American citizen of Pakistani descent, who was accused by the FBI for planting a car bomb in the New York’s busy Times Square on May 1, 2010 followed by fiery statements from the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton while the investigations were still underway.

[4] Wani, “39 yrs later, Ganga Hijack Trial Still On.”

[5] Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy: 1846-1990, 287-288.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., 290.

[8] Roy, “India’s Shame.”

[9] Ibid.

[10] Rediff.com, “Parliament Attack: Advani Points towards Neighboring Country,” December 14, 2001, http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/14parl21.htm (accessed July 12, 2010).

[11] The Indian Express, “Evidence Points to Lashkar: Govt,” December 14, 2001, http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=5541 (accessed July 12, 2010).

[12] Roy, “13 December: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament.”

[13] Ibid., xiii.

[14] Supreme Court of India, Judgment Information system (JUDIS), “State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) Vs. NAVJOT SANDHU@ AFSAN GURU.”

[15] Ibid.

[16] The book titled “13 December: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament” that comprises of sixteen essays written by Indian lawyers, academics, journalists and writers discusses in detail the anomalies present in the case, “raises questions about how Afzal, who never had proper legal representation, can be sentenced to death without having had an opportunity to be heard without a fair trial. They raise questions about fabricated arrest memos, falsified seizure and recovery memos, procedural flaws, vital evidence that has been tampered with, false telephone records, false testimonies, legal lacunae, material contradictions in the testimonies of police and prosecution witnesses, and the outright lies that were presented in court and published in newspapers. They show how there is hardly a single piece of evidence that stands up to scrutiny.” Roy, “India’s Shame.”

[17] BBC News, “Seven Die in Fresh India Blasts,” September 30, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7643390.stm (accessed July 13, 2010).

[18] It is true that there is no geographical proximity between Gujarat and Malegaon. However, the linkages between them could also have been drawn if the diffused bomb cases had been investigated. BBC News, “Police ‘Find 17 Bombs’ in Gujarat,” September 29, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7642937.stm, (accessed July 13, 2010).

[19] The eleven accused include: Sadhvi Pragnya Singh Thakur, Lt. Col. Prasad S. Purohit, Rakesh Dhawade, Swami Amritanand alias Dayanand Pandey, former armymen Ramesh Upadhyay and Jagdish Mhatre, Ajay Rahirkar, Shyamlal Bhanwarlal Sahu, Shivnarain Singh Kalsangra, Samir Kulkarni and Sudhakar Chaturvedi. The Times of India, “Court Upholds Charges Against 11 Malegaon Accused,” January 22, 2009, . http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Court_upholds_charges_against_11_Malegaon_accused_/rssarticleshow/4016364.cms (accessed July 13, 2010) Of the eleven accused, eight are arrested while the three are on the run.

[20] The prime accused Lieutenant Colonel Shrikant Purohit was a serving intelligence officer and according to the charge sheet, filed by Mumbai Police Anti Terror Squad which comprised 4,528 pages, he brought the explosives when he returned from his posting in Kashmir and gave it to Sadhvi who managed the Malegaon blasts. The charge sheet also stated that “Purohit floated right wing group Abhinav Bharat in 2007 with an intention to propagate a separate Hindu Rashtra with its own constitution and flag.” Bureau Report, “Malegaon blast chargesheet: Purohit is the main conspirator.”

[21] Major Kulkarni, the second important accused, had served the Territorial Army, the military’s civilian wing, for nearly 12 years before heading the Bhonsala Military School and College, Nashik, run by the Central Hindu Military Education Society. The Malegaon blasts were planned during the multiple meetings held at the school. Major (r) Ramesh Upadhyay has also been associated with BJP and headed the Mumbai unit of the BJP’s ex-servicemen’s cell. It was also exposed that he used to be funded by the party for his ‘work’. Thomas and Joshi, “Malegaon blast: Two Ex-Army Men Held”; also see, Mateen, “Retd Major Trained Sadhvi in Bomb-making: Prosecutor,” and Smita et al., “Rtd Major Under Probe has BJP Past.”

[22] Besides the military officers, the most prominent name in the Malegaon blast is Sadhvi Pragvi, whose bike was used in the blasts. She is the daughter of a long-time Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) member Chandrapal Singh and has been associated with several Hindu extremist organizations that include Akhil Bhartiya Vidgarthni Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), the student wing of BJP, Bajrang Dal Rashtrawadi Sena, and the Hindu Jagran Manch. She is also a founder member of the Vande Mataram Jan Kalyan Samiti, another Sangh Parivar’s myriad ‘cultural’ organizations. (Rana, “The Fiery and Fanatical Sadhvi”).

[23] Mushrif, “Who Killed Karkare,” 247.

[24] Ibid., 253-55 and 261.

[25] Rajesh, “At least 66 Killed in India-Pakistan Train Blast.” Since the incident occurred in the midnight between Feb. 18 and Feb. 19, it was reported in some papers as the incident of Feb. 18 and in some other as that of Feb 19.

[26] Reuters, “Indian Police Release Sketches of Bomb Suspects,” February 20, 2007,

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSDEL34195220070221 (accessed July 12, 2010).

[27] The Times of India, “BJP Seeks Anti-terror Bill in Budget Session,” February 19, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/BJP-seeks-anti-terror-bill-in-budget-session/articleshow/1639890.cms (accessed July 12, 2010).

[28] Durrani, “Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future Scenario,” 11.

[29] Special Prosecutor for Maharashtra ATS, Ajay Misar told the Nashik court that ‘a witness in the Malegaon blast case told the agency that Purohit had claimed he had 60 kg of RDX in his possession which he had got from Jammu and Kashmir while he was posted there and he provided the same explosives to a person named Bhagwan. Mustafa and Anubhuti, “Purhoit Supplied RDX for Samjhauta Bomb.” These findings were also further ratified by the Superintendent of Railway Police Baharati Arora in whose Jurisdiction the blasts took place. Thaindian News , “Purohit’s Custody Sought for Samjhauta Blast Probe,” November 17, 2008, . http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/purohits-custody-sought-for-samjhauta-blast-probe_100120262.html#ixzz0icOUFM5p (accessed July 12, 2010).

[30] BBC News, ”Bomb Hits Historic India Mosque,” May 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6668695.stm (accessed July 12, 2010).

[31] The Hindustan Times, “Needle of Suspicion for Blasts Points towards Terrorists,” May 18, 2007,

http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/andhrapradesh/Needle-of-suspicion-for-blasts-points-towards-terrorists/223746/Article1-223666.aspx (accessed July 12, 2010).

[32] In the course of Malegaon investigations, the accused confessed to have their involvement in the Mecca Majid blasts as well. The transcript of the recording between Mahant Sudhakar Dwivedi and retired Major Ramesh Upadhyay, two of the accused of Malegaon blasts, leaves no doubt regarding the real culprit. In the conversation, Major says “At the same time, there should be some people who can counter the terrorism of Muslims and Christians through action, like what happened at the mosque in Hyderabad or at other places. This was not something done by the ISI. This was one of our own men. However, from what I know, I cannot pinpoint who was specifically responsible. That I do not know. That, the Colonel will tell us.” Mir and Buddi, “Muslim Youth in Firing Line.”; Nair, “Mecca Masjid Blasts,” see also, The OutlookIndia , “Ajmer, Mecca and Malegaon Blasts Linked: CBI,” May 3, 2010, http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?680907 (accessed July 13, 2010).

[33] The Hindu, “External Forces Behind Hyderabad Blast,” May 27, 2007.

[34] AlertNet, “Seven More Bombs Found in Blast-hit Indian City,” August 26, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL211365.htm (accessed July 07, 2010).

[35] Chauhan, “CBI Confirms: Link between Ajmer, Mecca Masjid Blasts.”

[36] KS et al., “Terror Hits Ajmer Sharif Dargah; 2 Dead, 17 Injured.”

[37] Home Secretary said ‘Shahid Bilal of HUJI engineered the attack in collaboration of some sleeper cells of Jaish Muhammad. The secretary also said that Bilal would send the youth to Pakistan through Dhaka and Gulf for arms training. (Mushrif, op. cit., 130).

[38] Police sources say that in the course of narco analysis and brain mapping tests Lt. Col Purohit has revealed that another member Daynand Pandey, also an accused in the Malegaon blast, has planned the Ajmer blast (Mahan, “Abhinav Bharat under ATS Scanner for 7 Ajmer Blats.”). Col Purohit also admitted that Vishwa Hindu Parished (VHP) leader Praveen Togadia was involved in funding Abhinav. (Chakrabarti and Sumon, “Purohit Claims Togadia Funded Abhinav Bharat.”). Besides, in a very comprehensive article titled “India: Ajmer Blasts- Revisiting Hindutva Terror” Subhash Gatade while referring to various reports concluded that Ajmer blasts were the handiwork of the Hindutva terrorist group, Abhinav Bharat. (http://www.sacw.net/article885.html). In addition, the police have also drawn similarities between the Ajmer Sharif blast and the Mecca Masjid blast. “Sadhvi Pragyasingh and Ajay Rahirkar of Abhinev Bharat said in the police statement that Purohit also masterminded the blasts in Orissa, Karnataka and at Ajmer Sharif Dargah in 2007.” In addition S M Mushrif, the former Inspector General Police Maharshtra, argued that “An IPS officer, connected with the investigation of Malegaon case confirmed the involvement of the Malegaon accused in Ajmer blast case.” (Mushrif, op. cit., 134-135.) See Also, Thaindian News , “CBI-ATS Team Explores Abhinav Bharat’s Role in Ajmer blast,” October 23, 2009, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/cbi-ats-team-explores-abhinav-bharats-role-in-ajmer-blast_100264731.html (accessed July 13, 2010).

[39] On October 14, 2007 the bomb blast occurred at one of the cinema halls of a multi complex in Ludhiana Punjab in which six people were killed and over 30 injured. The hall has the capacity for 1,050 persons and due to the Eid festival, it was teemed with the people. (Singh, “Blast in Ludhiana Cinema Hall: 6 Dead, 30 Hurt.”). Although the blast caused six lives, the bombs were in fact misdirected and fortunately the horrific tragedy was miraculously averted, otherwise this incident would have been one of the greatest tragedies in the history of India.

[40] Garewal, “Police See Islamic Militants in Ludhiana Cinema Bomb.”

[41] Satinder, “Punjab Police Solves Ludhiana Bomb Blast Case, Mastermind Held.”

[42] Expre

[62] It was also discovered that the arrested accused were member of an extremist Hindu organization who had supplied the ammonium nitrate and other raw materials for preparing the bombs. Qasmi, “A Nation Riding On Killer Bicycles.”

[63] “Malegaon Police raided the pathology laboratory and recovered a revolver, RDX, 1000 rupees fake currency notes and arrested the owner of the laboratory, Jitender Khera, alongwith Nitish Ashire, Shab Rao and Sukhdev Dhevre. All belonged to the RSS.” For details see Chand, “Vigilance is the Prices of Liberty: Ugly Hidden Face of Terrorism.”

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Hindustan Times, “2 Killed in Kanpur Blast, Ingredients Found,” August 25, 2008, http://www.hindustantimes.com/2-killed-in-Kanpur-blast-ingredients-found/Article1-333532.aspx (accessed July 11, 2010).

[68] Thaindian News, “Ahmedabad Blast, Surat Bombs Linked: Police,” August 27, 2008,

http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/ahmedabad-blasts-surat-bombs-linked-police_10089337.html#ixzz0WpZBErPf (accessed July 11, 2010).

[69] Tribune News Service, “200 kg Ammonium Nitrate Recovered.”

[70] Ibid.

[71] Express News Service, “Court Accepts Charges in Thane Blast Case.”

[72] Express News Service, “ATS Makes up its Mind, Sadiq Freed of 7/11 Charges.”

[73] BBC News, “Pakistan Role in Mumbai Attacks.”

[74] Zeenews Bureau, “Indian Mujahideen Founder Member Caught: Mumbai Police.”

[75] Kasuri, “Peace Process and Post Mumbai Tension.”

[76] Bureau Report, “Co-founder of IM Sadiq Sheikh Sent to 14 Days Police Custody.”

[77] Since the Mumbai incident is being discussed here just to analyze whether this incident should be treated in isolation or in sequence with the previous terrorist acts of such kind, the lengthy details of the terrorists’ voyage, their attacks on various places and activities for almost three days are avoided. For such details, see Nasim, “Mumbai Dossier A Fairy Tale.”; and Misra, “Mumbai Terror Attack: Further Evidence of the Anglo-American-Mossad-Rss Nexus.”

[78] Nasim, op. cit.

[79] Ahmed, “Concluding Remarks: Pak-India Relations: Security Dynamics and Future Scenario.”

[80] Nizam, “Hindutva Hand In Mumbai Terror: Dal Khalsa.”

[81] The Times of India, “I was Supposed to be the Hidden Hand: Advani,” Mar 17, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/I-was-supposed-to-be-the-hidden-hand-Advani/articleshow/2872224.cms (accessed July 13, 2010).

[82] Srivastava, “India’s Army digs in Over Siachen.”

[83] Hindustan Times, “Srinagar Rally Attack an Act of Cowardice: Sonia,” May 21, 2006, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Srinagar-rally-attack-an-act-of-cowardice-Sonia/Article1-100274.aspx (accessed July 13, 2010); and Tribune News service, “Azad, Mufti Condemn Attack on Tourists.”

[84] the U.S. State Department , Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Background Note: India.”

[85] See “Lahore Declaration”, . http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/aptlahore.pdf, India Pakistan Joint Press Statement, Islamabad, January 6, 2004.

[86] The Times of India, “Kashmir Pact was Just a Signature Away,” April 24, 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kashmir-pact-was-just-a-signature-away/articleshow/5850851.cms (accessed July 13, 2010).

[87] Khan, “Running Away from Composite Dialogue.”

[88] The Times of India, “BJP walks out of Lok Sabha over India-Pakistan statement,” July 17, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS-India-BJP-walks-out-of-Lok-Sabha-over-India-Pakistan-statement/articleshow/4789352.cms (accessed July 13, 2010).

[89] Chandrashekhar, “India Hands Ajmal Kasab Death Sentence for Mumbai Attacks.”

[90] Carrie, “US Citizen David Headley Admits Role in Mumbai Attacks.”

[91] Laura et al., “Alleged Terrorism Plotter David Headley.”

[92] Robertson, “U.S. Warned India about Possible Mumbai Attack.”

[93] Misra, “Mumbai Terror Attack: Further Evidence of the Anglo-American-Mossad-RSS Nexus.”

[94] Mushrif, op. cit., 190.

[95] Ibid., 189.

[96] Herald, “Kasab Killed Karkare, Salaskar: 26/11 Trial.”

[97] The Economic Times, “Karkare was Unhappy about BJP Questioning his Integrity: Julio Ribeiro.”; Rajesh, “Karkare’s Response to a Death Threat: A ‘Smiley’.; The Indian Express Group, “Malegaon: MCOCA Slapped on Accused, PM Dials Advani,” November 20, 2008, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/malegaon-mcoca-slapped-on-accused-pm-dials/388349/ (accessed July 8, 2010).

[98] Zee News, “6/11: Karkare’s Wife Raises Questions about ATS Chief’s Death,” November 18, 2009, http://www.zeenews.com/news579995.html (accessed June 22, 2010).

[99] Mushrif, op. cit., 217.

[100] Bumiller, “Gates Warns of Militant Threat in South Asia.”

[101] Washington Times, “India Issues Terrorism Alert Over Hijack Plot,” January 22, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/22/india-issues-terrorism-alert-over-hijack-plot/ (accessed June 12, 2010).