The US Greater Middle East Initiative

The US “Greater Middle East Initiative” (GMEI) is a plan to transform the Muslim countries of the Middle East into democratic, secular and well-informed societies.

Policy Perspectives, Vlm 4, No.2

Abstract

[The US “Greater Middle East Initiative” (GMEI) is a plan to transform the Muslim countries of the Middle East into democratic, secular and well-informed societies. The plan includes mainly three areas of reform: promoting democracy and good governance, providing economic opportunities and disseminating knowledge in the society. This paper is an effort to analyze the real objectives of the US initiative, the US lobbying its allies and partners to support its initiative and the reaction and response from G8, NATO and EU. On the other hand, the paper also dilates on the responses of Russia and China to this initiative. Lastly, the paper analyses the dilemma that the US is facing for implementing its initiative and its future dispensation. – Author]

Introduction

The intricacies of dealing with this region are intensified by the fact that, historically, one or more superpowers have always remained involved in the internal matters of the Middle East, offsetting the rival superpower or groups of powers. Although apparently, such powers try to provide better solutions to problems in the region, their actions have demonstrated little concern about the actual issues, like territorial conflicts, ideological clashes and the struggles for ethnic dominance in the region. The present US reform initiatives in the region are apparently carried out in the context of efforts by external powers to bring changes — that may be permanent — in the internal situation of the region by strengthening security and stability among the regional states. Most of the West, especially the United States, considers that autocratic rule is the root cause of evils such as the lack of education, political institutions, economic development, and most importantly (for them) empowerment of women.

The US has expressed strong conviction that initiatives like the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) could eliminate the political and social unrest in the region that has been especially exacerbated since 9/11. Offshoots of the US anti-terrorism strategy and a “Forward Strategy of Freedom,” these initiatives are supposed to help reduce the threat of radical Islamic forces that have become more active as a reaction to the US-led War on Terror. It is important to understand what these initiatives are, how they can be useful in harbouring peace, harmony and stability in the region, and whether or not they can be expected to achieve the desired results.

The GMEI was published on February 19, 2004, by a London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat. Some analysts have argued that this ‘leaked’ US-compiled document was formulated on the recommendations of the MEPI, introduced by former US Secretary of State Colin Powell in December 2002, and by the UN’s Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 and 2003. The GMEI includes mainly three areas of reform: promoting democracy and good governance, providing economic opportunities, and knowledge in the society. The US hopefully projects that after two generations of transformation under this initiative, the Middle East may become a peaceful, democratic, pro-Western society where people speak fluent English and are neither anti-Semitic nor anti-American.

It is ironic that the GMEI comes so soon after the MEPI, which was itself hailed as the most comprehensive reform program presented by United States for the Middle East. The MEPI was based on four major elements related to economics, education, politics, and women’s empowerment. Its importance can be assessed from a speech made by Collin Powell on December 12, 2002 at the Heritage Foundation, in which he said, “I am announcing today an initiative that places the United States firmly on the side of change, of reform, and of a modern future for the Middle East…[MEPI] is a bridge between the United States and the Middle East, between our governments and our peoples, that spans the hope gap with energy, ideas, and funding.” The introduction of GMEI after such statements indicates that either MEPI was ineffective in implementation or there were elements present or missing in its blueprint that caused its failure.

In this backdrop, it is necessary to undertake a detailed probe of GMEI to understand its nature and the responses it has generated around the world.

Democratization in the Greater Middle East

It seems that the Greater Middle East Initiative was basically designed for the United States’ internal consumption rather than for the results it professes to seek. It is evident that since its establishment, it has been transformed into a complex of political, economic, social and military measures designed to strengthen the American strategic position and to deal with challenges to American hegemony emanating from the region by changing the social and political setup of some countries. Democratization, as one of the most important elements of the GMEI, is an example of the complex political measures of the United States. Since the idea of democratization was embraced by both Republicans and Democrats, this policy will be pursued by all political decision-making bodies and by their constituencies in the United States. However, the main proponents of the democratization theory are neo-conservatives, who argue that new challenges to the US will come from dictatorships. Moreover, there is difference of opinion within the United States on the modalities of democratization: in contrast to the conservatives, for example, the neo-cons do not believe in maintaining the traditional social setup of society in the Middle East but want to change it drastically. Therefore, after 9/11, by acting upon the continuation of policies, President Bush embraced this idea and engaged in the fight against terrorism using democratization as a tool in the Greater Middle East to achieve his objectives. This concept of democratization was featured in the speeches of US officials. They proposed the creation of free trade zones between the US and Middle Eastern countries and democracy assistance programs within the framework of MEPI in December 2002. In November 2003, President Bush provided an ideological foundation to democracy promotion in his speech at the twentieth anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. In 2005, the American initiative was further elaborated in the President’s second inaugural address. President Bush insisted that the US policy supports democratic movements and institutions in every country and culture with the purpose of ending tyranny in the world. A new version of the US National Security Strategy, published in 2006, maintains continuation of American assistance to democratic transformations.

According to the official website of the US State Department, from 2002 to 2005, more than 350 programs, related to democratization, were enacted in 15 countries on which $293 million were spent, of which 28 per cent went to promotion of democracy, NGOs and media; 33 per cent to economic reforms; 26 per cent to education; and 13 per cent to strengthening women’s role in society. To the Bush administration, it seems, forming a “new order” in the region was a cure for all diseases, most importantly, radical Islam and regimes hostile to Israel and the US. However, recent developments in the region indicate the inaccuracy of this supposition. Its implementation is therefore carried out more selectively and carefully nowadays than in the first years of the Bush administration.

In the democratization effort, a certain division of labor is evolving between Washington and its European allies. While the Americans stress on the need to democratize from the roots upward using elements of civil society, their European counterparts prefer democratization from the top down, encouraging evolution in the desired direction on the government level.

The American administration tried to get support for GMEI at the G-8 summit in June 2004. However, the declaration of the summit used diplomatic language and differed from the original American idea. Stressing “soft power,” persuasion and partnership, the declaration was more influenced by the European approach. The summit defined spheres of responsibility in bilateral cooperation with the countries of the Greater Middle East, underlined the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for security, and recommended engagement with Japan for democracy promotion through a Japanese-Arab dialogue. In the final G-8 declaration, some very questionable propositions were removed, including a citation of Iraq as an example of democracy promotion in the region.

The Bush administration has justified its invasion of Iraq on three grounds: preventing Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), removing the terrorism threat, and transforming the Middle East from a region ruled by dictators and autocrats to one ruled by democratically elected governments. As the first two arguments turned out to have weak foundations, the administration put more emphasis on the third. The Democratic Party in the US has failed to highlight and to challenge the administration’s rationale for policy shifting in the region. It is only recently, under pressure from on ground actual developments in Iraq and other places that the American policy makers, including some figures in the Bush administration, have started to realize that democracy promotion by America alone is not going to be enough to transform the Middle East. Toppling Saddam Hussein and holding elections in Iraq did not solve America’s problems in the region. In fact, while the old problems have remained unaddressed, meddling in the internal affairs of the Greater Middle East has opened a Pandora’s box of new problems that are further destabilizing the region.

Within the United States, support to the Iraq campaign is waning. Some 50 per cent of Americans surveyed under the Pew Global Attitudes Project are in favor of the fastest possible withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, and 55 per cent would like a troop withdrawal according to a definite timetable, while two thirds are apprehensive that the American government will delay it. The Baker-Hamilton Commission also called the Iraq Study Group [ISG]), which comprised of five Republican and five Democrat members, issued its report on December 6, 2006. Among its main recommendations, the ISG calls for an increase in American troops in Iraq in the short term to provide conditions for their gradual pull-out by the first quarter of 2008. It also suggests that the United States try to engage Iran and Syria constructively in order to encourage their greater efforts in achieving stability in Iraq. The Commission further advises that the issue of Iran’s nuclear programs be kept within the purview of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council along with Germany.

Washington takes a selective approach in implementing the GMEI in different countries, depending on the overall character of bilateral relations and the individual countries’ significance in US national interests. Officially, the majority of the leaders of the Middle East support the idea of democracy, at least in their declarations. In reality, the democratization process is taking place in very complicated circumstances and with dubious results. Authorities in the small states without considerable raw resources or large markets are more actively engaged in democracy promotion. The political leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while publicly supporting the need for democratic transformation, take a very careful approach in its implementation. Since 2001, the Saudi owned pan-Arab media has given the floor to plurality of views, some of which defend American actions in the Middle East and call for social and religious reforms, conveniently avoiding any mention of political changes in the Arab world.

American programs under the Initiative are being actively introduced in Morocco, Yemen, Bahrain, and other countries of the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Their implementation is much weaker in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Money allotted to this Initiative was used during the election campaigns in Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen, in seminars on legal questions in Oman and Bahrain, and for women candidates in the elections for the Moroccan Parliament. Economic programs are being undertaken in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. However, even in the countries that support the Initiative, societies are very sensitive to Western-style democracy promotion.

The Role of NGOs in GMEI

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both in the US and in the target countries, are important tools in the Initiative. Since nationalist and secular forces quite often adopt an anti-American posture, US strategists find it difficult to cooperate with them. Therefore, NGOs are used to disguise American interference in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries and, as the American experts suggest, to try and find social groups, especially moderate Islamist groups advocating modernization of Islam that could be reliable helpers of the US as it promotes its agenda in the region. Such use of NGOs leads to the rise of religious and factious factors, exacerbating intra-religious and communal tensions and destabilizing the situation in the region. Through one such NGO, the Committee on the Present Danger, former and present American politicians recommend an array of means to undermine the ruling regime in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including:

• Support of dissidents;
• Cultural, academic and professional exchanges, and invitation of young activists to short-term seminars;
• Undermining of institutions that serve as the foundation of the state (special services; the army; professional, ethnic, religious groups, etc.) with the promise of a better future if they join the opposition;
• Sanctions against leaders of the state alongside with gathering of evidence of their criminal offences, such as corruption and financial misdeeds, murders of political opponents, tortures, and development of weapons of mass destruction;
• Use of media to influence the Iranian public; and
• Dialogue through special intermediaries with the aim to persuade them to quit politics, explaining alternatives to their disobedience (imprisonment, execution, etc.).

Attempts to export democracy through NGOs have faced resistance from the ruling elites of many countries, which suspect interference in internal affairs and violation of national sovereignty. Measures to control and curb activities of NGOs that are not loyal to the government have been introduced. Nevertheless, American NGOs like the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute have been actively involved in elections in various countries of the region through local groups and organizations. The National Endowment for Democracy budget increased in 2006 from $20 million to $80 million. According to the financial statement of this NGO, its financial support was channeled through the US State Department and only 3 percent of the total funds came from private sources. It is important to note here that such NGOs were formed to conceal direct support of foreign political parties by the US government. Money provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is transferred to foreign recipients through different institutions of the Republican and Democratic parties of the US, the US Chamber of Commerce, trade unions and other NGOs. If the conditions in the target country are deemed unfavorable, NGOs based in neighboring countries are used by the US to monitor and influence the situation.

Among non-government entities used to achieve the goals of these initiatives, media organizations are also prominent. The Bush administration devotes considerable efforts to democratize the countries whose governments refuse to participate in the democracy assistance programs. In 2006, it allocated $85 million to finance satellite television programs, and from 2001 to 2006, the US quadrupled its radio and television broadcast time in the region; it now amounts to 50,000 hours per year.

Countries opposing American policies in the region face harder measures for democratization from Washington, including efforts to undermine ruling regimes from the territories of Third World countries.

Economic Measures in the GMEI

The economic part of the Greater Middle East Initiative aims at encouraging economic growth through development of small and medium-sized private businesses. Economic programs under the initiative have financed the revision of commercial laws and upgradation of information technology in line with “modern requirements” in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Moroccan farmers are being trained to overcome difficulties they may encounter after the introduction of a free trade zone between the US and Morocco. Young entrepreneurs are offered training in US companies.

President Bush declared the creation of a free trade zone with the Middle East as part of efforts to encourage economic reforms in the region. The zone should be established by 2013. The US already has Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and Oman. Negotiations are under way with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Middle East Free Trade Area Coalition, including representatives of leading American companies and the Middle East Economic Caucus lobby for FTA in the US Congress, are supposed to contribute to economic reforms in the region.

The American administration would like to tie economic relations to progress in democracy, but Washington has not come up with a clear understanding of how this is to be achieved in American-Arab relations, given other strategic goals such as settlement of regional disputes and the War on Terror. Despite the rhetoric on democratization, economic opportunity, and women’s empowerment and human rights, the relationship between the Persian Gulf Arab countries and the United States is expected to remain focused on oil in exchange for weapons, engineering, and automobiles.

The US administration and Congressional supporters sell trade agreements to the American public as instruments of national security rather than ways for greater economic development. There is deep concern among the American public about the economic and social costs of trade agreements. A few critics oppose the policy of helping to improve economic opportunities abroad as a means of reducing threats of terrorism. US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick referred to US trade policies as “competitive liberalization,” under which the administration singles out and punishes or rewards individual governments according to political criteria. Bahrain was rewarded with a US Free Trade Agreement for providing a base for the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Egypt was punished because it did not support a US complaint before the WTO about the EU ban on genetically modified foods.

The bilateral trade agreements that the US administration is negotiating in the Greater Middle East weaken the ability of governments to make laws in the public interest while sheltering foreign investors from domestic law. For example, the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement prohibits national legislation limiting the patenting of life forms and disallows government procurement regulations designed to assist local business and to protect the environment. Trade agreements between the US and countries of the Greater Middle East allow investors to avoid national courts, taking their cases to international dispute mechanisms. These prohibitions on national legislation undermine representative governments in the region. Thus, the agreements compromise the very goals of the initiative, i.e. to encourage representative government, the rule of law and civil society in the Middle East. Overall, the economic component of the initiative — a series of bilateral free trade agreements intended to culminate in a Greater Middle East Free Trade Area —undermines the political component — the civil society building projects intended to promote democratic governance in the region.

The Roles of the G8, NATO and EU

Since the Afghanistan war, the US administration has highlighted the cause of bringing a “new order” to the Greater Middle East, announcing GMEI and seeking transatlantic approval for it at the June 2004 summits of the G8, US-EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

G8: The G8 Summit’s declaration of a “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa” is diplomatic in tone and does not simply adopt the US initiative. It indicates that the Middle East will become the focus of international geopolitics and, thereby, largely determine relations between Europe and America in the years to come. Originally, the US initiative included multilateral and bilateral measures to democratize Middle Eastern countries, offers of free trade to individual countries, the geographical extension and deepening of the Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-Mediterranean partnership, and a program of military cooperation akin to NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Unhappy with the way the GMEI was communicated — or, rather, not communicated — to the states and societies in the Middle East, as well as because of what many Europeans saw as omissions or problematic assumptions underlying it, public opinion in Europe did not react enthusiastically when it first appeared.

There were two reasons, however, for European policy makers to react in a critical but generally welcoming manner to the initiative. First, the GMEI reflected a much more cooperative approach — with regard to the Europeans and other G8 partners at least — than most of what Europe had seen from the Bush administration during the first three years of its rule. Many European leaders therefore saw it as a source for healing Trans-Atlantic relations, which had been badly strained before and during the Iraq War. Second, the initiative reflects a rethinking on the part of the Bush administration: a growing awareness, in the wake of the war in Iraq, that in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, it is not enough to make military threats to unfriendly regimes or to topple them. From this experience, it seems Washington has realized that externally enforced “regime change” is not enough and that structural problems in the region need to be tackled.

That said, America’s GMEI is still far from worked out to the last detail. In fact, the grandiose geopolitical concept embodied in the title of the initiative partly conceals a lack of fresh ideas. This situation constitutes an opportunity for Europe. Instead of merely tagging along with US initiatives, it can — and should — play a prominent role in shaping the debate about a comprehensive trans-Atlantic strategy towards its southern neighbourhood.

Russia: In the “Partnership for Progress and Common Future with the Region of Greater Middle East and North Africa Initiative,” the role of Russia — one of the four non-European countries besides the US, Japan and Canada in G8 — is restricted to consulting and technical assistance in terms of the Russian experience in this field. Russian delegations take part in exchange and training programs at the level of parliamentarians, political parties and NGOs. The Russian Federation is interested in evolution, not revolutions, in the region. It believes transformation of the region should make it a predictable and reliable partner in the international community. Moscow is against “export of democracy” and calls for international efforts that would stabilize the region rather than democratize it. The Russian approach is anchored on the region and its problems which, Russia holds, need to be solved comprehensively depending on the needs of each country. The reforms should take into account the historical development of the region, the many factors influencing it, as well as their possible consequences.

NATO: NATO has shifted its priorities to the East, activating Partnership for Peace programs to take former Warsaw Pact countries on board. There is a consensus in the regional body that it should have a global outreach dealing with security problems. The US pushes NATO to engage the Greater Middle East region militarily and to establish partnership ties. NATO has bilateral agreements for the action plans with a number of countries. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership comprises of different fields of cooperation without political conditions to build an atmosphere of confidence and security in the region.

At the NATO Istanbul Summit in 2004, three initiatives were publicized. The officially declared purpose of one of these initiatives is to promote dialogue, interoperability, support in the fight against terrorism and military reform. Partner countries are encouraged to make their military budgets transparent and place their armed forces under civilian control. The initiative is supposed to deepen the existing dialogue between NATO and seven countries in North Africa and the Middle East to the level of a real partnership.

The second initiative, called the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), is addressed to the Persian Gulf countries. To avoid political complications, it has some restrictions in its applications. The initiative has no projects with respect to the American intervention in Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In cases of Israeli involvement in the initiative’s programs, the cooperation is carried out separately with every Arab country to avoid boycott.

The third initiative, called the “NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq,” deals with the training of a new Iraqi army. This encountered some problems because of different attitudes towards Iraqi occupation within NATO.

The main obstacles to cooperation between NATO and countries in the region are financial shortages, conflicting interests of NATO members, and a lingering image of NATO as an instrument of the Cold War. The Iraqi problem and Middle East conflict will need to be settled to clear the way for comprehensive cooperation.

EU: For more than a decade, Europe and the US have been actively involved in promoting democratic reform in the Middle East. While many of their goals have been the same, their policies have differed significantly. Europe’s role has consisted of low-key initiatives, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (which is part of the Barcelona Process launched in 1995). The position of the US, on the other hand, has fluctuated from active diplomatic engagement in the region — mostly during Bill Clinton’s years — to direct military intervention by George Bush’s administration, later on. Despite formally joining the Greater Middle East project, French President Jacques Chirac has criticized the initiative, saying the region does not need “missionaries of democracy.”

France, the Netherlands and Spain have increased governance funding for the region. The European Commission (EC), the executive body of the EU, has promised increased aid for Arab governments that agree to consider human rights plans. The EC has redirected some of its development aid into human rights projects. The most distinctive element of the European initiative is its cooperative approach, which is based on “facilitating but not imposing change,” and on building partnerships with Middle Eastern countries.

European initiatives do not focus directly on democracy or democracy-building. Activities relevant to political reform are quietly hidden within broader governance and development initiatives.

It should be borne in mind that, despite the differences among the countries involved in the EU-US relationship, their societies share similar values as well as political and economic principles. Europeans and Americans agree on the need to fight terrorism, ease Middle-Eastern conflicts, find a solution to the Iraqi problem and guarantee the provision of oil at reasonable prices.

China’s Response

The People’s Republic of China has diverse interests in the Middle East, with economic considerations playing a major role. Despite China’s efforts to diversify sources of imports, it still relies heavily on Middle Eastern oil — the Middle East currently provides over 45 percent of China’s total oil imports.21

Beijing will play an increasingly active role in the region with the goal of maintaining its own energy security. Beijing has to make sure that oil flows unimpeded and its price does not skyrocket. It has little choice but to support efforts to stabilize the region. Thus, though China is opposed to US hegemony and does not want imposition of democratic reforms from outside, the Chinese approach is cautious, yet pragmatic. Beijing will cooperate with different forces in the region to expand its influence with the various Middle East protagonists — Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

While Beijing supports Arab domestic reform, consistent with its resistance to unilateral action, the Chinese government will oppose any outside attempts to impose reform. During a visit to the Saudi capital in April 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged in a speech to the Saudi Shura Council that “China is ready to work with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to strengthen peace and development in the Middle East and to build a world of peace, stability and prosperity.” China’s new activism is a reflection of Chinese interests — especially in the energy sector. Beijing will work to achieve stability in the region and will oppose those who try to destabilize it.

The Dilemma and the Future

Washington faces a dilemma while promoting its initiative in ally countries with so-called “autocratic” rulers. The more the democratization process gets under way, the more it undermines the very governments that support the US in the region. There is a very definite possibility that those autocratic governments may be replaced with popularly elected leaders who will be less friendly or, more dangerous for Washington, anti-American, following the will of their electorate.

If democratic elections are held in some Greater Middle East countries, a real alternative to present-day leaders may be Islamist forces. The latest elections in the region indicate that in countries with a dominant ruling party or where a king is a ruler, the Islamist candidates were in second positions and formed oppositions (with the exception of Lebanon and Morocco where secular attitudes prevailed). A considerable share of the population in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and UAE would like an increasing role of Islam in their countries. According a survey report in 2005, some 50 percent of Egyptians were against dominance of religion in politics but 47 percent supported a stronger role of religion in political life.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood used opportunities to propel its candidates to the Parliament in 2005 elections. It now boasts 88 Islamic members of Parliament, which support the Brotherhood agenda. Meanwhile, other Egyptian parties reduced the number of women candidates in their lists for elections, which runs contrary to Washington’s idea of democratization.

HAMAS came to power despite American efforts to boost the popularity of Al-Fath in the democratic elections in Palestine in 2006. USAID spent $2 million on short-term projects trying to improve the image of Al-Fath.

Under international pressure, the Syrian authorities are more inclined to allow Islamic radicals to publicize their views. Relaxation of rules in Syria helped to legalize the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the ideology of which resembles Nazism.

And, of course, export of democracy to Iraq resulted in radicalization of the entire Middle East and daily bloodbaths of ethno-confessional conflicts. According to the New York Post, more than 40 percent of suicide bombers attacking American and Iraqi targets in Iraq were Saudi nationals. Only 9 percent were of Iraqi origin, the rest hailing from Kuwait, Syria, Palestine, Afghanistan and even France.

Although the desire for democracy may be heartfelt, the United States has a lengthy list of other priorities in the region: access to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace between Israel and its neighbors, stemming the proliferation of WMD, and preventing Islamist radicals from seizing power. Its failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict prevents the United States from gaining credibility as a true and sincere advocate of democracy in the Middle East. Liberal Arabs perceive claims by the United States that it wants democracy in the Middle East as hypocritical, pointing to what they see as American indifference to the rights of the Palestinians and unconditional support for Israel.

Moreover, fighting Islamist militants, democratizing the region and safeguarding oil still compel the United States to cooperate with authoritarian regimes. People in the region watch as the United States take a tough line against Iran and Syria while failing to push Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and other friendly authoritarian rulers very hard. For their part, many Arab governments do not take US pressure to democratize their region seriously, believing that the need for oil and fear of upsetting regimes that recognize Israel will trump Washington’s desire for democratic change.

For the Americans, another unexpected result of the democracy promotion exercise and the war in Iraq has been an increase in anti-American sentiment in the region. Two polls, conducted separately in 2005 and 2006 by Zogby International and the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, show that anti-American feeling in the Arab nations is at an all-time high. The poll data show a deep suspicion of American motives: 65 percent of those surveyed said they did not think democracy was a real US objective in the Middle East.

From the perspective of the population of target countries, the Greater Middle East Initiative suffers from two major drawbacks. First, it largely evades a key issue, the role of Islam in their politics and society, and offers an implicit criticism of the role of Islamists in the regional social environment. This explicit omission is considered to be an intentional effort, as religion’s role in politics constitutes a lightning rod in the debate over reform. However, Islamists constitute perhaps the single most influential grassroots force in the region. As a result, the GMEI does not establish the basis for a clear dialogue for reform that reaches across the secular-Islamist divide.

Second, the initiative fails to resonate with the Arab “street.” It is usually hailed by the Arab world’s Westernized, liberal elite — a group with limited influence at the popular level. Indeed, the initiative has engendered a hostile reaction from many in the Arab world.

Yet, grassroots sentiment in the region is not inherently anti-democratic; many key themes articulated by reformers, such as the need for transparency and accountability, are echoed in Islamist discourse. However, in a somewhat predictable response, negative reaction in the Arabic-language press often stems from assertions that the US in particular and the West in general would exploit the initiative to impose its will on the region.

The invasion of Iraq and subsequent increase in the rhetoric of democracy to justify it may change the rules of accepted international behavior and references to gauge it, but democracy promotion will not remove the underlying factors that influence the situation in the Middle East. To get positive results from these initiatives, the US needs to change the approach of its “global War on Terror,” from a source of aggression to a partner of peace by strengthening its credibility in the target countries in particular and the world in general. It would be more favorable for the region if the US develops an environment of trust and cooperation, rather than aggression and coercion, in the Greater Middle East, so that any and every kind of dispute and crisis may be resolved through dialogue. The US also needs to realize that, if it sincerely wants to democratize the region, it needs to recognize the genuine and true leadership that emerges as the real representative of its people, rather than bringing artificial and made-up leaders into power through negative means.

If the US Greater Middle East Initiative succeeds, it may lead to democratically elected governments in the region. Those governments will have to address the very issues that the American administration tries to avoid, circumvent or solve to its own advantage: resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and economic development aimed at formation of strong independent nation-states. There is no guarantee that popularly elected governments will conduct policies supportive of the US agenda in the region. Taking into account the results of the Palestinian elections and developments in Lebanon and Iraq, it may be fairly assumed that further rise of tensions may take place. If the governments in the region fail to address the problems, they will run the risk of losing credibility before their own people.

GMEI is supposed to create favorable conditions for US investments and open the local markets through bilateral free trade agreements limiting the scope of local legislation. This means that economic development of the region will be subordinate to the interests of transnational companies with local priorities demoted to the backstage. Manufacturing, which contributes to the development of a politically assertive middle class, is not encouraged by the new trade agreements.

It is likely that both Republican and Democratic US administrations will selectively use democracy promotion tools as their foreign policy instruments since politicians in both camps are in favor of using this ideological cover.

As for the situation in Iraq, if the US administration’s plans develop in favorable conditions, the main mission of the US forces will evolve into supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. US military presence will probably be reduced to rapid-reaction and special operations teams, training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue. American intelligence and support efforts will continue.

Failure of the American initiative in the region may lead to emergence of new geopolitical configurations and partial US retreat from the region, including reduction of American political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. This will open a window of opportunity to the creation of a new security mechanism in the region which will have to incorporate interests of the major local actors. Because of the region’s significance to the world, external powers will still have influence on the local developments, however, hopefully, this influence will be less intrusive. The US may adopt an “over horizon” approach to the security needs of the region, which will replace direct American involvement. In both scenarios, smaller states in the Persian Gulf will have some interest in relying on the US balancing the influence with their bigger neighbors.

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