Turkey Today: Emerging Ideological Scenario
Political Dimension
To understand the political scenario in Turkey, it would be pertinent to discuss major political actors, their position in domestic politics, and the impact of their ideas on the foreign policy.
Turkey is a multi-party democracy but there are four major political actors in the country. To start with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this party can be compared with the Christian Democrat Party in Europe. Because of the sensitivities involved in Turkey, it does not pronounce itself as Muslim democrat; rather the party likes to be called conservative democrat, meaning that their members are Muslims in person but the party upholds the free market based liberal agenda. AKP is the champion of privatization, creating better conditions for foreign and domestic investment, increasing the role of the economy, liberal values, and so forth. AKP’s policy with regard to the Kurdish issue also reflects its liberal spirit. So far, Turkey has tried to cope with the Kurdish problem by non-political methods: using the army, especially in the early 1990s, but it realizes that military means have failed so far. Hence, AKP is supporting a political method to cope with this problem. Three years ago, the Kurdish initiative (Kürt açılımı) was commenced to speak with the Kurdish political elite and to make some efforts to solve the problem in a peaceful or in a political manner, which was harshly criticized by other political parties.
AKP’s foreign policy towards the Middle East appears to be an Islamic oriented and ideologically motivated posture, but it is not correct. In fact, the main mission of AKP is to enlarge its zone of interest, rather than zone of influence. There was a general Middle East policy drawn by Shaban Talash that envisages economic interactions with other neighboring countries, including Pakistan.
The second actor in Turkish domestic politics is the Republican Peoples Party, the traditional secular Kemalist Party, albeit with variance from some of the ideals of Kemal Ataturk. There are different ways of interpreting Ataturk’s ideology. The Kemalists’ interpretation is not shaped by conservatives: it is the product of the second Turkish president, Ismet Inonu. Currently, Kemalism is in a deep intellectual crisis, mainly because it offers no clear policy towards emerging challenges such as issues regarding Turkey’s European Union membership, the Israel-Palestine conflict, Iran, etc. The main problem with this version of Kemalism is its policy of continuing political efforts through the elite in the higher judiciary or bureaucracy and military, which is becoming a hurdle for it in persuading people. This aspect is reflected by the fact that AKP, the ruling party, has at least one deputy in 80 provinces out of the total 81 provinces in Turkey. Even in southeastern Turkey, which is a Kurdish majority area, only AKP and the Kurdish Party have their representatives but the Republican People’s Party cannot even organize a political meeting there. In that sense, the Republican Party has failed to create a new generation to reflect on Kemalism and the international system, and it lacks the intellectual capacity to cope with or overcome the contemporary problems. If AKP wins the elections in June 2011, which might happen as AKP has won almost all elections in the last eight years, it will have a catastrophic effect on the Kemalist elite.
The third mainstream player is the National Action Party, a typical traditional nationalist party in Turkey. During the Cold War era, the National Action Party used to be a transitional party, dealing mainly with the problems of Central Asian Turks. But after the end of the Cold War, it replaced the Kemalist or the Kurdish PKK and now it is obsessed with the Kurdish problem. Its percentage in the elections remained 10 percent or 11 percent. This party has confined itself to a few cities which are known for nationalist tendencies. In terms of ideology, the National Action Party is very critical of the European Union and the lacking focus on Central Asia in foreign policy, etc.
The fourth political actor is the Kurdish Movement, which is quite important for Turkey. The Kurdish Movement so far could not create an independent political action, mainly because of the structure of PKK, a “terrorist organization.” Kurdish politics is dominated by the PKK. Interestingly, Kurds are very religious people, but PKK is a Marxist group for many reasons; one of the reasons comprises of the radical secular forces of state, which act as a layer to protect the Marxist aspect of PKK vis-à-vis conservative Kurdish people. On the other hand, the Kurdish Movement was never allowed to develop an independent Kurdish political elite, which makes the case for Turkish state very difficult. One would hardly find any interlocutor to speak through the Kurdish people. There are some signs of change but, in general, the PKK still holds the ground. Therefore, it is quite difficult to understand Kurdish demands as some Kurdish elite call for a federal structure; some others talk only about policy reforms by the government, and some are said to look towards the AKP. Recently, the Kurdish initiative was launched with an approach to solve Kurdish issue through political means.
These are some important aspects of the Turkish domestic politics that affect the course of foreign policy formulations. For instance, since the National Party fails, many people from nationalist and secular constituencies are now voting for AKP. This might be a critical problem for AKP in the foreign policy, because having the support of these nationalist groups may bring some problems in formulating pro-Middle Eastern or pro-EU policies, or formulating a liberal agenda for the Kurdish issue. This shows the dynamism of Turkish domestic politics. A political party, which won majority seats in the elections in the early 1990s, won only one percent of the votes in the next election. So, the people’s active participation in the national political process and domestic constituencies is very dynamic.
With regard to foreign policy, it seems AKP is the monopole in Turkey. As it has been mentioned earlier, Islam is not an important factor in Turkish policy formulation. It is true that people are socialized in an Islamic environment, but Turkey’s approach to the Middle East or Arab countries is basically motivated by economic concerns. Turkey is a developing country and it is facing some serious conflicting issues. For instance, considering the general Turkey-US political and strategic relations, their trade volume is around US$16 billion, which is very small in comparison with the Turkey-Russia US$25-billion trade volume. There are serious problems in trade with Western countries, excluding some European countries such as Germany. The trade volume between Turkey and Israel is very small (around US$2 billion).
Another factor is that the current Turkish political elite want to increase Turkey’s independence in terms of formulating a foreign policy in the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey wants to emerge as a regional actor, which means that Turkey has its regional vision. Some may think it is difficult to make it a reality. For instance, there is a problem with regard to Israel. It is also difficult to say for sure what the US thinks about this regional vision, because there are contradictory signs in the American perspective. The case of the relationship between Iran and Turkey is another point in that direction. On the one hand, Turkey and Iran have some kind of historical contacts, but on the other hand, historically speaking, Iran has its own regional vision just like Turkey, which may create friction between the two. So, in Central Asia, Armenia, Lebanon, etc., one of the real competitors to Turkey’s regional interests is Iran.
Summing up, the critical question is whether AKP will be ruling Turkey after the June elections. Although the recent polls suggest support for AKP sways around 45 percent, Turkey’s politics is quite dynamic and nothing is definite. Unless there is a change in the government, however, a dramatic shift in Turkish foreign policy is not expected, as AKP has been ruling Turkey for more than eight years and it has developed some kind of fixed understanding and perspective towards the Middle East or Arab countries, and the regional conflicts.
Chair: As expected from a person of Dr. Bacik’s caliber, it was another very bright presentation, full of intriguing and thought provoking analyses. Now, we begin the second Q&A session.
